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Fore word
At the close of the 20
th cen tury, greatly enhanced capac ity to antici pate and address natu ral
dis as ters means that seri ous food emer gen cies are almost always due to vio lent con flict and
other human actions. Con flict pre ven tion, con flict reso lu tion, and post con flict recon struc  tion
efforts are cru cial to posi tive sce nar ios for food, agri cul ture, and the envi ron ment in 202 0.
The end of the Cold War has, para doxi cally, led to a pro lif era tion of inter nal con flicts and
civil wars, from the landmine- filled val leys of Afghani stan to teem ing camps of uprooted peo pl e
in the former Zaire. As a direct result, tens of mil lions of peo ple face hun ger, mal nu tri tion , and 
dis rupted live li hoods, includ ing refu gees, inter nally dis placed peo ple, and those trapped
within bat tle zones.
In this paper, Ellen Messer, Marc J. Cohen, and Jashinta D’Costa show how hun ger is
often a direct result of vio lence, as war ring par ties lay siege to cit ies, destroy food sup pli es,
dev as tate pro duc tive capaci ties, and demol ish social struc tures in order to sub ju gate thei r
oppo nents. Too often, food itself becomes a weapon of war. Hun ger is also an inevi ta ble or
inci den tal out come of the ways wars are waged.
In addi tion, the authors show how hun ger can recip ro cally cause con flict. Vio lent strug  -
gles often result from real or per ceived resource scar ci ties, com bined with a broad sense of
injus tice. Racial, eth nic, relig ious, and ideo logi cal dif fer ences are fre quently impli cate d, as
in the ongo ing civil war in Sudan that has left one of every three chil dren in that coun try
 malnourished.
The spread of con flicts in the 1990s means that an increas ing share of food and devel op -
ment assis tance must go to meet imme di ate humani tar ian needs at a time of over all decline in
aid. Resources are ever scarcer for the invest ments in equi ta ble and sus tain able devel op ment
that could pre vent vio lence.
The paper rec om mends new think ing to break the hunger- conflict- hunger chain. The
authors call for includ ing con flict pre ven tion in food secu rity and devel op ment efforts, as well 
as new link ages between food secu rity and devel op ment on the one hand, and emer gency
relief on the other. Aid must fos ter coop era tion rather than con trib ut ing to the nega tive co m pe  -
ti tion that can cause con flict. Such new think ing is abso lutely essen tial if the world is to s uc -
ceed in turn ing the 2020 vision of uni ver sal food secu rity and sus taina bly man aged natu ral
resources into a real ity.
Per Pinstrup- Andersen
Di rec tor Gen eralvii
Pre fa ce
The proj ect “Food from Peace,” spon sored by IFPRI’s 2020 Vision for Food, Agri cul ture, and 
the Envi ron ment ini tia tive, origi nated as a ses sion and work shop con sul ta tion at the Annu al
Hun ger Research Brief ing and Exchange, held at the World Hun ger Pro gram, Wat son Insti  -
tute for Inter na tional Stud ies, Brown Uni ver sity, April 5–7, 1995. Ellen Messer, then direc to r
of the World Hun ger Pro gram took prin ci pal respon si bil ity for the proj ect con cep tu ali za ti on
and writ ing. She was assisted by Tho mas Mar chione, then vis it ing asso ci ate pro fes sor
(research) at the World Hun ger Pro gram, who took prin ci pal respon si bil ity for mod el ing, da ta
analy sis, and writ ing the sec tions enti tled “Food Pro duc tion For gone,” and “Quan ti fy ing t he
Links between Con flict and Food Pro duc tion.”  Mar chione also super vised Z. Fesshaie and
M. Yohan nes, who con trib uted Eri trean and Ethio pian case stud ies on post con flict inter ven -
tions. Marc J. Cohen, then of Bread for the World Insti tute, pro vided the con cep tu ali za tion
and fig ures on food and devel op ment aid and also hosted a con sul ta tion at Bread for the World  
Insti tute. He was assisted by Jashinta D’Costa, then of Bread for the World Insti tute. IFPRI
pro vided fund ing for the work shop as part of the activi ties of the 2020 Vision ini tia tive. Th e
authors acknowl edge the assis tance of David Nygaard and Annu Ratta then of IFPRI over the
course of final iz ing this paper. Yas sir Islam of IFPRI and Rich ard Longhurst of the Com mon  -
wealth Sec re tar iat pro vided help ful com ments on the first draft.
Par tici pants in the con sul ta tion for “Food from Peace,” held at Brown Uni ver sity in
April 1995, were Wil liam Bender, World Hun ger Pro gram; Dan iel Chel liah, Bread for
the World Insti tute; Marc Cohen, Bread for the World Insti tute; Joanne Csete, UNI CEF;
Jashinta D’Costa, Bread for the World Insti tute; Anto nio Don ini, U.N. Depart ment of
Humani tar ian Affairs; Bernd Drees man, Euronaid; Zerai Fesshaie, World Hun ger Pro gram;
Tim Frank en berger, CARE; Jane Guyer, Direc tor, Afri can Stud ies Cen ter, North west ern
 University; Tse gaye Hailu, Tigray Devel op ment Asso cia tion; Bar bara Harrell- Bond, Oxford
Uni ver sity; Peter Hazell, IFPRI; Rich ard Hoehn, Bread for the World Insti tute; Michael
 Horowitz, Insti tute for Devel op ment Anthro pol ogy; Lin diro Kabirigi, PRE FED, Burundi;
Shubh Kumar, IFPRI; Akin Mabo gunje, Devel op ment Pol icy Cen ter, Nige ria; Tho mas
 Marchione, World Hun ger Pro gram; Ellen Messer, World Hun ger Pro gram; Larry Minear,
Humani tari an ism and War Pro ject, Wat son Insti tute for Inter na tional Stud ies; Tom  Rear don ,
Michi gan State Uni ver sity; Peter Ros sett, Food First; Hans Singer, Insti tute of Devel op ment
Stud ies, Sus sex Uni ver sity; Peter Uvin, World Hun ger Pro gram; Sis ter Chris tine Vla di mi ro ff, 
Sec ond Har vest; Tho mas Weiss, Wat son Insti tute for Inter na tional Stud ies; and Mizanekris to s 
Yohan nes, World Hun ger Pro gram.1. Introduction
After 20 years of opti mism, inter na tional food and
nutri tion experts are pre sent ing a more cau tious
world food out look (see, for exam ple, Pinstrup-
 Andersen, Pandya- Lorch, and Rosegrant 1997).
Although the world as a whole now enjoys a food
sur plus, over the next two dec ades, annual growth
rates of yields of major cereal crops are expected to
slow, while global popu la tion is expected to grow
by 2 bil lion peo ple. Cul ti vated land areas are dimin  -
ish ing, and envi ron mental and bio logi cal resources
are being degraded and destroyed. Devel op ing
coun tries also face eco nomic threats to their food
secu rity because mul ti lat eral trade agree ments will
likely reduce food sur pluses in the devel oped coun  -
tries, raise grain prices, and shrink food aid. Future
food secu rity in devel op ing coun tries is also men  -
aced by cut backs in for eign assis tance, an increas  -
ing pro por tion of which is now allo cated to dis as ter
situa tions, reduc ing the amount avail able for agri -
cul tural research invest ment.
These fac tors sug gest that de vel op ing coun tries 
will face grow ing food defi cits, food in se cu rity, and 
nu tri tional in se cu rity. They may also face en vi ron  -
mental deg ra da tion and natu ral re source scar ci ties
that will end in greater com pe ti tion and con flict
(Brown and Kane 1994; Kaplan 1994). Sev eral re -
cent stud ies have pro posed a sig nifi cant link be -
tween en vi ron mental re source scar city and vio lence 
(Homer- Dixon 1991, 1994). This paper ex pands
this propo si tion to con sider sig nifi cant link ages
among en vi ron mental re source scar ci ties, con flict,
food, and  hun ger.
The paper ar gues that armed con flicts (armed
strug gles in volv ing more than 1,000 deaths) or “food 
wars” con sti tute a sig nifi cant cause of de te rio rat ing
food sce nar ios in de vel op ing coun tries. “Food wars”
are de fined to in clude the use of hun ger as a weapon
or hun ger vul ner abil ity that ac com pa nies or fol lows
from de struc tive con flict (Messer 1990). They have
al ready been shown to be a sa li ent fac tor in the
fam ines of the 1980s and 1990s (for ex am ple, Bohle
1993; Messer 1994; Mac rae and Zwi 1993, 1994;
Messer 1996a). Al though geo graphic in for ma tion
and fam ine early warn ing sys tems and in ter na tional
food re serves es tab lished after the fam ines of the
mid- 1970s pro vide both timely early warn ing and a
ca pac ity for emer gency re sponse, ac tive con flict or
so cial dis or gani za tion ac com pa ny ing or fol low ing
con flict pre vent food dis tri bu tion.
Food wars are also a grow ing cause of chronic
un der pro duc tion and food in se cu rity, where pro  -
longed con flicts pre vent farm ing and mar ket ing and 
where land, wa ter works, mar kets, in fra struc ture,
and human com mu ni ties have been de stroyed. The
data sug gest that most coun tries and re gions that
are cur rently food in se cure are not hope less under  -
producers but are still ex pe ri enc ing the af ter math of 
con flicts, po liti cal in sta bil ity, and poor gov ern ance. 
Their food pro duc tion ca paci ties are higher, and
me dium- to longer- term food out looks brighter,
than cur rent pro jec tions pre dict.
Re cip ro cally, food se cu rity can help pre vent
con flict and is es sen tial for sus tained and peace ful
re cov ery after wars have ended. A prin ci pal source
of con flict lies in lack of food se cu rity, as ex pe ri  -
enced by dif fer ent house holds and com mu ni ties;
 religious, eth nic, and po liti cal groups; and states.
Yet both peace and food se cu rity re main elu sive for
many war- ravaged coun tries where deci ma tion or
flight of ma te rial and human re sources make a re  -
turn to nor mal food and live li hood se cu rity dif fi cult
to achieve.
To many ana lysts, this per ni cious cycle of hun  -
ger, fol lowed by con flict, fol lowed by hun ger,
seems un break able. Neo- Malthusians, con cerned
about popu la tion growth and eco nomic stag na tion,
es pe cially in Af rica, in sist population- resource im  -
bal ances lead in evi ta bly to hun ger, ac com pa nied by 
ill ness, war fare, and ex cess deaths. They view the
de vel op ing world as ei ther a pow der keg of civil
1dis or der and vio lence or a bas ket case of en vi ron  -
mental de te rio ra tion and des ti tu tion (for ex am ple,
Kaplan 1988, 1994). But case stud ies so far have
been un able to iden tify the exact thresh olds of en vi  -
ron mental de te rio ra tion or per ceived scar ci ties that
push popu la tions over the line into non re sil ient
decay or vio lence (for ex am ple, Homer- Dixon 1991).
Anti- Malthusians coun ter that popu la tion pres  -
sure–led cy cles of scar city, cri sis, and de struc tion
can be averted and that scar city is al ways rela tive to
human in ge nu ity, tech no logi cal in no va tion, so cial
re struc tur ing, and po liti cal and eco nomic pol icy
(Bose rup 1965). Tech no logi cal op ti mists argue that 
popu la tion, far from being an in evi ta ble time bomb, 
ac tu ally trig gers tech no logi cal and in fra struc tural
im prove ments. This per spec tive ap pears in the
early lit era ture of the Green Revo lu tion (S. Sen
1975), in the writ ings of cer tain Af ri can tech nolo  -
gists (Juma 1989), and in the en cour ag ing food out  -
looks of cer tain econo mists (Mitchell and Ingco
1993) and other ana lysts such as Simon (in Myers
and Simon 1994). These op ti mists argue that evi  -
dence for de te rio rat ing re sources is faulty and that
tech no logi cal in no va tion and ap pli ca tion can meet
the chal lenges. Un for tu nately, none has been able
to dem on strate how in con tem po rary war- ravaged
set tings, human popu la tions might serve as a re  -
source and stimu lus to re store hope, re build food
se cu rity, and re move de spair.
This paper ex plores in de tail the mul ti ple con  -
nec tions be tween food in se cu rity and armed con  -
flict by re view ing the ex tent of “food wars,”
 estimating ag ri cul tural and other costs of con flict,
and ex tract ing pol icy les sons from case stud ies of
Rwanda and Eri trea that sug gest ways to re duce
link ages be tween con flict and food in se cu rity
through more care ful aid pro grams be fore, dur ing,
and after con flicts. The dis cus sion brings to gether
“world food and hun ger out look” and “armed con -
flict— food cri sis” per spec tives to cre ate a more
com pre hen sive food, ag ri cul ture, and en vi ron ment
vi sion for 2020 (IFPRI 1995).
22. Armed Conflict and Hunger
The Extent of Armed Con flict
in the Con tem po rary World
In 1996 armed con flicts, mainly in the form of civil
wars and their after math, put at least 80 mil lion peo  -
ple at risk for hun ger and mal nu tri tion (Hansch
1996). Humani tarian assis tance sources located
some 30 mil lion peo ple in zones of active con flict,
includ ing those in eight devel op ing coun tries where 
inter nal con flicts left more than 11 mil lion peo ple
depend ent on humani tar ian assis tance (Table 1). In
another 13 coun tries, more than 14 mil lion peo ple
con tin ued to require humani tar ian assis tance in the
after math of war (Table 2). A higher esti mate would
include addi tional popu la tions in the 47 coun tries
that have expe ri enced wars since the 1970s. Many
of these peo ple are still suf fer ing, to vary ing
degrees, from mal nu tri tion and loss of access to
food, although not acute food short ages (fam ine),
as a result of the con flicts (Messer 1996a). Box 1
dis plays these coun tries by region.
Con flicts in the 1970s and 1980s were fueled in
large part by Cold War poli cies that encour aged
spend ing on arms and used food as a politi cal tool.
In 1989 hun ger was being used as a weapon or
existed as a con se quence of ear lier wars in 20 areas
(exclud ing the East ern Bloc) (Messer 1990). These
were Afghani stan, Angola, Burma, Cam bo dia, Chad,
El Sal va dor, Ethio pia, Gua te mala, Indo ne sia–East
Timor, Iraq, Iran, Mozam bique, Nica ra gua, Peru,
the Phil ip pines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Uganda, and Viet Nam. Largely as a result of the
3
Table 1— Need for humani tar ian assis tance in
areas of active con flict, Decem ber
1996
Coun try                             
Num ber of peop le
 in need of hu ma ni ta rian
as sis tan ce
(mil lions)
Af ghani stan 2.0 a
Bu rundi 0.4 
Iraq 4.0 
So ma lia 0.8 
Sri Lanka 0.9 
Su dan 2.0 
Tajiki stan 0.6 
Za ire 0.5 
Sources: FAO 1996; U.S. Mis sion to the United Na tions 1996;
ACC/SCN 1996; U.N. Of fice for the Co or di na tion of Hu  -
mani tar ian Af fairs.
a Authors’ es ti mate, based on am bigu ous re ports from the United Na  -
tions De part ment of Hu mani tar ian Af fairs.
Table 2— Need for humani tar ian assis tance in
post con flict coun tries, Decem ber
1996
Coun try
Num ber of peop le
in need of hu ma ni ta rian
as sis tan ce
(mil lions)
An gola 1.4
Ar me nia 0.4
Az er bai jan 0.9
Bos nia
a 2.3




Li be ria 1.1
Mo zam bique 0.2
Rus sia (North ern Cau ca sus) 0.4
Rwanda  1.4b
Si erra Le one 1.3
Sources: FAO 1996; U.S. Mis sion to the United Na tions 1996;
ACC/SCN 1996; Nahro 1996; and web sites of the Food and
Ag ri cul ture Or gani za tion of the United Na tions, the U.N.
 Office for the Co or di na tion of Hu mani tar ian Af fairs, and the
World Food Pro gramme.
a  In cludes other parts of former Yugo sla via.
b  Situa tion un der go ing rapid change in De cem ber 1996.wind ing down of the Cold War after 1989, peace
and prog ress toward free elec tions have been
 formally pur sued in Angola, Cam bo dia, El Sal va  -
dor, Eri trea, Ethio pia, Gua te mala, Mozam bique,
Nica ra gua, and South Africa. In all these cases,
how ever, hun ger endures as a leg acy that con trib -
utes to lin ger ing con flicts (Messer 1996a, 19–20).
More posi tively, a return to food secu rity has
accom pa nied greater politi cal sta bil ity in Uganda
and Viet Nam. But off set ting these gains are
renewed hos tili ties in Burundi, Haiti, Iraq, Mex ico,
Rwanda, Soma lia, Tur key, and Zaire and a pos si ble
major new cul tural con flict and humani tar ian emer  -
gency in Nige ria.
These con flicts also un der lie the in crease in the
number of peo ple who cross in ter na tional bor ders
as refu gees. The number of refu gees rose to 23 mil  -
lion in 1996, up from 2.5 mil lion in 1974,
1 and
the number of in ter nally dis placed per sons who
 remained within their origi nal state’s bor ders was
4
Source:  Messer 1996a; ; U.N. Of fice for the Co or di na tion of Hu mani tar ian Af fairs.
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1 Not all of these peo ple re ceived of fi cial rec og ni tion as refu gees from the U.N. High Com mi s sioner for Refu gees.es ti mated at 27 mil lion (Hansch 1996). Refu gees
high light the tru ism that con flicts have an im por tant 
re gional di men sion; they af fect the live li hoods and
food se cu rity of house holds and in di vidu als lo cated
far from the origi nal fight ing. Peo ple in neigh bor ing 
coun tries suf fer losses in en ti tle ments and ac cess to
food when fight ing spills across bor ders, dis rupts
re gional com merce, or in tro duces refu gee streams
who must be fed. Refu gees ap pro pri ate en vi ron  -
mental re sources and com man deer food, thereby
cre at ing scar ci ties of water, fuel, and food for local
popu la tions. Their sales of cat tle and valu ables, and
some times of labor, dis tort re gional and local ex  -
change econo mies, again plac ing live li hood and
sub sis tence at risk for resi dents.
Ad di tional eco nomic dis rup tions ac com pany
conflict- related sanc tions. In the af ter math of the
Per sian Gulf War, Jor dan, which had sided with
Iraq, faced sanction- related bans on cus tom ary
com merce plus po liti cal pen al ties that re duced in  -
come from trade, for eign aid, and re mit tances by
US$1.5 bil lion.
2  Coun tries as far away as Paki stan
and the Phil ip pines suf fered losses in in come that
re duced food se cu rity when for eign work ers in Iraq
were asked to leave and not re turn.
Re gional con flicts dis tort most na tional econo  -
mies in a re gion, whether or not their gov ern ments
are di rectly in volved in the fight ing. From 1994
through 1996, Rwan dan Hutu refu gees de sta bi lized
and de for ested ref uge areas in Zaire. Rwan dan and
Bu run dian Tutsi in ter ven tion, aimed at elimi nat ing
these Hutu refu gees and pre vent ing their re pa tria  -
tion, is cred ited with fi nally top pling Za ir ian dic  -
tator Mobutu Sese Seko from power (McKin ley
1997). The Thai bor der re gion has been de sta bi lized 
po liti cally and eco nomi cally by refu gees from the
Cam bo dian civil war, who, self- settled or main  -
tained in refu gee camps, trans formed the po liti cal
econ omy of the re gion and added a bur den some
mili tary pres ence. Ar gua bly, the flood of in dige nous 
Gua te ma lans flee ing mili tary bru tali ties in the early
1980s chal lenged the eco nomic and po liti cal sta bil  -
ity of the south ern Mexi can state of Chia pas, even as 
the Mexi can gov ern ment sought to re set tle refu gees
away from po ten tially vola tile po liti cal areas.
Con trib ut ing to meet ing the food needs of refu  -
gees places a par ticu lar bur den on recipi ent com  -
mu ni ties where food secu rity is already mar ginal.
Addi tional demands by new com ers for food, water,
land, and fuel can reduce house holds that were only
mar gin ally food secure to acute food short age. In
bad years, when house holds are forced to sell assets
to buy food, they often find mar kets dis rupted, for  -
age areas stripped, and buff ers such as live stock
reduced in value because refu gees are also unload  -
ing their ani mals. Such con di tions can turn sea sonal 
or chronic food inse cu rity into acute fam ine and
cause deaths far from the fight ing. Refu gees flee ing 
the fight ing in north ern Chad, for exam ple, upset
mar kets in west ern Dar fur, Sudan, dur ing the
drought years 1983–85, trans form ing that food
short age into a “fam ine that kills” (DeWaal 1989b). 
Although in cer tain refugee- recipient regions, relief 
agen cies such as the Inter na tional Fed era tion of
Red Cross and Red Cres cent Socie ties (IFRC) pro  -
vided assis tance to resi dent vil lag ers as well as refu  -
gees in an effort to pre vent short- term suf fer ing or
resent ment lead ing to con flict, over the longer term
these efforts also con trib ute to eco nomic dis tor tions 
and may leave local and regional econo mies in dis  -
ar ray when refu gees uproot and return home, as in
Malawi (Walker 1994). Return ing refu gees, who
can intro duce to their home com mu ni ties dis eases
such as AIDS, which have short-, medium-, and
longer- term con se quences for health and food secu -
rity, also add to the bur den of resi dent com mu ni ties
(Torres- Anjel 1992).
How Con flict Causes Hun ger
Food Short age
The most obvi ous way armed con flict affects hun -
ger is through the delib er ate use of hun ger as a
weapon. Food short ages and fam ine deaths occur
where adver sar ies starve oppo nents into sub mis  -
sion. Acts of siege war fare include seiz ing or
5
2Trade was lost ow ing to the em bargo against Iraq as well as to Jor dan’s de ci sion to sup port I raq. In ad di tion to losses from the
cross- border trade with Iraq, Jor dan suf fered losses when Saudi Ara bia banned Jor da nian truck s from car ry ing fruits and vege ta bles
through its coun try to Gulf states. In a sin gle year, US$300 mil lion in re mit tances from Jor d a nian work ers in Gulf states were lost.
These same work ers re turned to swell the ranks of the un der em ployed in Jor dan (Brit tain 1991 ; Feuil her ade 1992).destroy ing food stocks, live stock, and other assets
in food- producing regions; cut ting off mar keted
sup plies of food in these and other regions; and
divert ing food relief from intended bene fi ci ar ies
to the mili tary and their sup port ers. Farm ing popu  -
la tions are also reduced by direct attacks, ter ror,
enslave ment, or forced recruit ment and by mal nu  -
tri tion, ill ness, and death. As farm ing popu la tions
flee, decline, or stop farm ing out of fear, pro duc tion 
falls, spread ing food defi cits over wider areas.
Land- mining and poi son ing wells are addi tional
hos tile acts that turn tem po rary acute food short -
ages into longer- term insuf fi cien cies; these acts
force peo ple to leave and not return and thus inter -
rupt food pro duc tion and eco nomic activi ties per -
ma nently. Conflict- linked food short ages thus set
the stage for years of food emer gen cies, even after
fight ing has offi cially ceased.
To coun ter act food short ages and pre vent fam  -
ine deaths, the in ter na tional com mu nity has main  -
tained geo graphic in for ma tion/fam ine early warn  -
ing sys tems and food re serves since the 1970s.
Where in for ma tion sys tems iden tify im pend ing or
ac tual acute food short ages, the United Na tions and
bi lat eral do nors, with the IFRC, the World Food
Pro gramme (WFP), and non gov ern men tal or gani  -
za tions (NGOs), or di nar ily move food and other
emer gency care into af fected zones to pre vent
 starvation and suf fer ing. Such in ter ven tions also
are meant to fore stall in vol un tary mi gra tions by
would- be vic tims. By the 1980s, early warn ing and
re sponse had been largely suc cess ful in pre vent ing
fam ine ex cept in war zones.
Mov ing food into zones of armed con flict to pre  -
vent fam ine deaths, there fore, be came a major goal
of hu mani tar ian as sis tance and fam ine re lief (Mi near 
et al. 1990; ICN 1992). Un for tu nately, much of the
food aid in tended for non com bat ants is hi jacked by
war ring par ties, who use con trol of food aid to re  -
ward would- be sup port ers, starve out op po nents, and 
keep con flict alive. In Ethio pia the Mengistu gov ern  -
ment, after starv ing the op po si tion, used food aid
stra te gi cally to re move and forci bly re set tle op po si  -
tion popu la tions (Clay 1988). In south ern Sudan both 
gov ern ment and op po si tion forces have used fam ine
as a weapon to con trol ter ri to ries and popu la tions
since the late 1980s. Gov ern ment and re sis tance
forces com man deer emer gency food, which en ables
both sides to fight on and also to use food as an
 instrument of se lec tive eth nic and re lig ious op pres -
sion (Af ri can Rights 1994a; Keen 1994; Mi near
1997). In both situa tions se lec tive food short ages
were first cre ated and then main tained by those who
con trolled and di verted food aid. Among Rwan dan
Hutu refu gees, con trol of food dis tri bu tion in refu gee 
camps has been a chief source of po liti cal power.
Do nated food in tended for the most vul ner able
women and chil dren found its way first to pow er ful
male in ter ests, ena bling them to keep in va sion ary
hopes alive.
Trans port ing and guard ing emer gency food sup  -
plies in con flict situa tions also be comes a chief source
of live li hood, ve hi cles, and arms for would- be com  -
bat ants. Such dis tor tions have led some ana lysts
(Af ri can Rights 1994a; Mi near 1997) to argue that
food aid pro longs con flicts and should be stopped
un less it can be de liv ered with more over sight. A
con tinu ing chal lenge for do nors is how to de liver
food and other es sen tial aid in ways that can re lieve
food short ages and renew pro duc tive ca paci ties
with out re fresh ing the fight ers.
Food short ages related to con flicts also can be
char ac ter ized as enti tle ment fail ures where politi cal 
pow er less ness or eco nomic des ti tu tion—usu ally
both—pre vent com mu ni ties, house holds, or indi  -
vidu als from get ting access to food even where it is
avail able. After being stripped of essen tial assets
includ ing tools, live stock, and jew elry, or par lay ing
them into food to meet imme di ate nutri tional needs, 
peo ple find them selves with out fur ther resources.
Conflict- related des ti tu tion thus cre ates con di tions
of chronic food inse cu rity and short age for house  -
holds that oth er wise may have been tem po rar ily or
sea son ally short of food.
Food Pov erty or Food Inse cu rity
Less dra matic but more per va sive is the chronic
food in se cu rity cre ated by con flict that usu ally lin  -
gers long after ac tive fight ing has ceased. Food
 insecurity, or poverty- related hun ger, fol lows from
armed vio lence that dis rupts mar kets and live li  -
hoods and leaves house holds with out suf fi cient re  -
sources to ac cess food.
Armed vio lence de stroys as sets of ci vil ians and
re moves whole com mu ni ties or se lected house  -
holds and in di vidu als from cus tom ary sources of in  -
come. Where manu fac tur ing and mar ket areas are
6bombed, or trans port dis rupted, live li hoods are
 destroyed over wide areas. In ad di tion, con flicts
dis rupt mi gra tory labor and re mit tance pat terns
over broad re gions, as has been shown in the re cent
con flicts in the Horn of Af rica and Iraq.
Mul ti ple years of war fare remove entire age
cohorts from for mal school ing and ordi nary social -
ization and cause longer- term mul ti gen era tional
under em ploy ment and under de vel oped peace time
work skills. Poverty- related hun ger is likely to per  -
sist well after the armed strug gles have ceased in
South ern and West Africa and Cen tral Amer ica
because more than 20 years of armed vio lence has
under pre pared the younger gen era tion for any voca  -
tion other than fight ing. After wars have destroyed
natu ral and social resource bases, peo ple must
reform and rebuild com mu ni ties, regain land titles,
recon struct water works, replant trees, and recruit
seeds, ani mals, and tools to restore live li hoods.
They must also rec on cile hos tili ties and dis trust that 
in some cases pre date active fight ing. None of these 
are quick turn arounds, and all con trib ute to con tinu  -
ing under pro duc tion, pov erty, mal nu tri tion, and
risk of renewed vio lence.
To over come food in se cu rity and break cy cles
of con flict, do nors such as CARE have fo cused on
re stor ing live li hood se cu rity through pro grams that
at tempt to use food re lief for de vel op ment, and
 create new em ploy ment or en tre pre neu rial skills
through train ing or mi cro credit pro grams. Food is
not sim ply given away but serves as pay ment when
peo ple re build bunds, re con struct roads, or re seed
for ests. Tools, seeds, and small loans are ad di tional
in stru ments (CARE- USA 1995). But such food-
 for- work (FFW) or income- generation proj ects in
ac tive- or post con flict situa tions often suf fer from
in suf fi cient country- level in fra struc ture to plan,
 implement, and moni tor them. They may also lack
the community- level or gani za tions needed to ne go  -
ti ate labor con tracts and food dis tri bu tions be cause
after wars, com mu ni ties are still re group ing. FFW
pro grams ad di tion ally are criti cized on hu mani tar  -
ian grounds be cause women and chil dren or oth ers
most in need of food may be too weak to work. The
case of post war Ethio pia il lus trates all these con  -
straints. In 1994 it ap peared that Ethio pia would
have to im port the bulk of its food for years to come
(Davies 1994; Max well and Li rensu 1994). Good
har vests in 1995 and 1996 re duced the food gap
but could not cre ate con comi tant in fra struc ture or
en ti tle ments to reach all those who were mal nour  -
ished and too poor to ac cess the ad di tional food.
 Rebuilding en ti tle ments to food may en tail trade  -
offs be tween meet ing the im me di ate food needs of
the most food- deprived and mal nour ished and build  -
ing food- security ca paci ties over the longer term.
Food Dep ri va tion or
Nutri tional Inse cu rity
Indi vid ual food dep ri va tion, or nutri tional inse cu  -
rity, refers to protein- energy or micro nu tri ent mal  -
nu tri tion, which may afflict indi vidu als even in
situa tions where com mu ni ties and house holds
appear to be food secure. Women, chil dren, the eld  -
erly, or socio eco nomi cally mar ginal mem bers of
house holds such as ser vants or those of other eth nic
iden tity may be deprived of ade quate food or suf fer
mal nu tri tion even where house hold food sup plies
are ade quate or plen ti ful. In situa tions of active con  -
flict, women and chil dren or oth ers who are left
behind may have less access to food after men
mobi lize into armed forces or migrate in search
of addi tional food or employ ment. They also face
ele vated risks of ill ness and mal nu tri tion when
health care serv ices and social serv ice insti tu tions
are destroyed. Emer gency food rations may be
nutri tion ally unbal anced and insuf fi cient to meet
their micro nu tri ent and protein- energy needs. In the 
absence of addi tional mar kets and sources of food
and income, their food, sup plies, health, and care
are jeop ard ized.
Dis placed and refu gee popu la tions are par ticu  -
larly vul ner able to nu tri tional dep ri va tion, re lated
res pi ra tory and gas tro in tes ti nal dis or ders, and vio  -
lence in the crowded and un hy gienic con di tions of
emer gency camps. Men with guns can out- compete
ci vil ians, the in tended bene fi ci ar ies, for hu mani tar  -
ian food aid. Women eve ry where are the spe cial
 targets of vio lent physi cal and sex ual abuse, and
such ter ri fy ing ex pe ri ences in ter fere with their post  -
war re cov ery and re turn to nor mal so cial and
 economic be hav ior (el Bushra and Piza- Lopez
1994). Chil dren are also spe cial vic tims of vio lence.
The United Na tions Chil dren’s Fund (UNI CEF)
  (1994, 1996) estimates that more than 1.5 mil lion
chil dren have been killed, more than 4 mil lion physi  -
cally dis abled, and more than 12 mil lion ren dered
7home less in con flicts over a dec ade. Ele vated lev els
of chil dren’s clini cal mal nu tri tion and mal nu tri tion-
related dis ease and deaths per sist in war zones even
after  conflicts have ceased be cause chil dren have
been trau ma tized and physi cally and psy cho logi  -
cally dis abled and be cause health serv ices have
been de stroyed. In ad di tion, war- torn coun tries are
less able to plan and im ple ment nu tri tion pro grams to
over come child hood  mal nu tri tion. The United Na -
tions Ad min is tra tive Com mit tee for Co or di na tion–
Sub- Committee on Nu tri tion (ACC/SCN) and
 UNICEF found prog ress in elimi nat ing child hood
mal nu tri tion to be least evi dent in 11 coun tries that
were  recently war torn. These coun tries were also
clas si fied as least likely to meet World Sum mit for
Chil dren nu tri tion goals (Mason, Jons son, and Csete 
1996, 171–172).
Donors have tried to respond to the spe cial
needs of the food deprived by tar get ing food for
refu gee areas and by try ing to address the spe cial
food, health, and psy cho logi cal needs of women
and chil dren. Some crit ics rec om mend that emer  -
gency aid be deliv ered directly to women, who are
more likely than men to feed chil dren (Afri can
Rights 1994a,b, 1995). Aid ana lysts have also
empha sized the need to address the health and care
dimen sions of nutri tion, in addi tion to food issues.
Delib er ate, Inevi ta ble, and
Inci den tal Impacts of Con flict
Siege is a war tac tic used de lib er ately to de stroy food 
sup plies and pro duc tive ca paci ties and to bring
 besieged popu la tions to sub mis sion. Re cent siege
tac tics in clude pre ven tion or di ver sion of food aid,
eco nomic sanc tions, and do nor poli cies that se lec  -
tively with hold food aid and ban com merce. In this
last case the goal is the re moval of a leader or re  -
gime, not the sub mis sion of an op pos ing popu la tion.
Asset strip ping that en riches and em pow ers
 aggressors over vic tims is an other de lib er ate tac tic
with long- term and dev as tat ing con se quences
(Keen 1994). The sei zure of Dinka re sources by
government- supported mi li tias in south- central
Sudan sys tem ati cally put Dinka land, live stock, and 
newly dis cov ered oil in the hands of north ern Su da  -
nese gov ern ment in ter ests. It re duced the Dinka to
pen ury and re moved them as a po liti cal threat.
Delib er ate destruc tion of health and edu ca tion
serv ices, com mu nity lead er ship, and social struc  -
tures are intended to deprive younger folk of cus tom  -
ary sociali za tion, access to food and medi cine, cul  -
tural knowl edge, and inter gen era tional nur tur ance.
These tac tics were used in con flicts in Libe ria,
 Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. In Mozam bique,
Renamo insur gents delib er ately tar geted health
infra struc ture in acts of vio lence that afflicted com  -
mu ni ties as well as gov ern ment (Green 1994). They
iso lated youth from their com mu ni ties to dis rupt
inter gen era tional trust and trans fer youths’ loy al ties
to them. Like other insur gents, Renamo also dis  -
rupted cus tom ary cul ture and civil ity by per pe trat ing
vio lence against women, who would ordi nar ily have
been pro tected by intact kin ship struc tures. Such acts 
destroy human dig nity and social capac ity, as well as 
mate ri als and infra struc ture, cre at ing imme di ate
food short ages that also set the stage for chronic food 
inse cu rity for some time to come.
Other losses are the in evi ta ble or in ci den tal out  -
comes of the ways wars are waged. Rural crop ping
pat terns and units of food pro duc tion in evi ta bly
change as na tional mar kets be come in ac ces si ble.
Rural food in se cu rity usu ally in creases be cause local 
food pro duc tion can not rise to a level suf fi cient to
 replace mar ket food sources plus feed popu la tions
swol len by refu gees from urban and other rural areas
who also need to live off the land. More peo ple are
usu ally hun gry, al though ag gre gate  statistics do not
re veal the ex tent or dis tri bu tion of short falls.
Rural pas tor al ists tend to be at higher risk be  -
cause their mo bil ity is cir cum scribed, tra di tional
pas tur age ranges can be come in ac ces si ble, and
 remaining pas tur age zones are un der mined by over  -
graz ing. Even where their as sets have not been
 deliberately stripped or their live stock com man  -
deered by the mili tary, pas tor al ists suf fer ele vated
losses in in come when fight ing or refu gee move  -
ments dis tort live stock mar kets. For mixed
pastoralists- agriculturalists, de ple tion of herds and
pre cipi tous drops in the price of live stock re move
house hold buff ers against short falls and elimi nate
as sets avail able to in vest in their fu ture food sup ply. 
The elimi na tion of ani mals in curs ad di tional costs
for ag ri cul tur al ists, who lose ma nure for their crops
as well as ani mal trac tion, with out which crop
yields de te rio rate and food sup plies fall. With out
being able to “bank” on live stock, herding- farming
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hav iors. House holds that in more sta ble times held
crops as well as live stock as in sur ance against sea  -
sonal short age, in stead sell them im me di ately to
gain mo bile as sets that are less eas ily seized or
 destroyed. Re mov ing such buff ers sets the stage
for acute food short age in years of crop fail ure,
as shown dur ing An go la’s and other civil wars
(Sogge 1994).
The food in se cu rity that ac com pa nies mar ket
dis rup tions also may be an in ci den tal rather than a
de lib er ate out come of hos tili ties. For ex am ple, the
di ver sion of trucks to the mili tary in the Ni ge rian
civil war of the 1960s in ci den tally wreaked havoc
on mar kets and trade (Ma bo gunje 1995). Live li  -
hoods in evi ta bly suf fer where mi gra tory labor
 unrelated to a par ticu lar con flict is cut off from
reach ing sources of em ploy ment and in come. Be  -
cause of the Su da nese civil war, work ers from
south ern Kordo fan in Sudan could no longer mi  -
grate to their jobs in other re gions. Bang la deshi and
Fili pino guest work ers re moved from Iraq were
 unintended vic tims of the Per sian Gulf War, as
were house holds de pend ent on their re mit tances.
Crops in evi ta bly suf fer in war zones. An nual
crops may not be sown, tended, or har vested, and
longer- term ag ri cul tural in vest ments may be lost,
par ticu larly where per en nial crops are de stroyed.
But wage and trade losses usu ally far ex ceed those
of ag ri cul ture as rural house holds are cut off from
urban mar kets and net works that or di nar ily pro vide
them with di ver si fied live li hoods and buff ers
against scar city. Poorer house holds also suf fer be  -
cause con flict en cour ages a kind of preda tor mer  -
chant class that bene fits from the suf fer ing of most
oth ers. As often stated, not eve ry one in situa tions
of con flict or fam ine is food short, and some al ways 
profit. Profi teers de lib er ately take ad van tage of
 others, but the con texts al low ing their pros per ity are 
an in evi ta ble part of the ways wars are waged.
Mal nu tri tion and sick ness also ap pear to be
 inevitable con se quences of con flict, al though much
ill health is in ci den tal rather than de lib er ately
caused. Where hun ger is used as a weapon, women
and chil dren in par ticu lar are at risk for mal nu tri tion 
be cause they have higher re quire ments for mi cro  -
nu tri ents and nu tri tion ally dense foods, which are
often un avail able. Dis place ment, mi gra tion, and
con cen tra tion of refu gees in “safe” areas in crease
their con tacts with and vul ner abil ity to in fec tious
res pi ra tory and di ar rheal dis eases, which are chief
kill ers in refu gee situa tions (De Waal 1989a). Popu  -
la tion move ments in ad ver tently carry dis eases such 
as ma laria across whole re gions or in tro duce new
kil ler dis eases when refu gees re turn home. Such
non delib er ate health dis tur bances in evi ta bly re duce 
food and nu tri tional se cu rity and jeop ard ize re cov  -
ery from con flict stress. Also, 5 mil lion chil dren
were dis placed by wars in the 1980s (UNI CEF
1993), leav ing a gen era tion of in di vidu als who are
so cially, eco nomi cally, psy cho logi cally, and physi  -
cally dis ad van taged.
Under ly ing Causes of Hun ger
and Con flict
Hun ger and con flict usu ally have roots in struc tural
vio lence; in co lo nial lega cies and sta tist poli cies of
rac ist or re lig ious ex clu sion and political- economic
dis crimi na tion (see, for ex am ple, Heg gen houghen
1995); and in strug gles over con trol of stra te gic
 resources, con ven tion ally land, wa ter, and trade
routes, but more re cently, oil. Sources of dis con tent
in clude skewed land dis tri bu tion, ex ces sive tax bur  -
dens, and wage and price poli cies that pre clude
 decent stan dards of liv ing. Une qual ac cess to edu ca  -
tion and nu tri tion serv ices, and une qual treat ment
be fore the law, en flame per cep tions of un fair ness
and of ten vio lent de sire for change. De ni als of civil-
 political or economic- social- cultural rights based on
race, re lig ion, eth nic ity, geo graphic lo ca tion, po liti -
cal ide ol ogy, or oc cu pa tion rouse ani mosi ties. Ten -
sions ripen into vio lent con flict es pe cially where
eco nomic con di tions de te rio rate and peo ple face
sub sis tence cri ses. Hun ger causes con flict when peo  -
ple feel they have noth ing more to lose and so are
will ing to fight for re sources, po liti cal power, and
cul tural re spect.
Envi ron men tal Resource Scar ci ties
and Sub sis tence Cri ses
Armed up ris ings have ac com pa nied strug gles for
land, water, and other es sen tial re sources per ceived
to be in ade quate over all or un fairly dis trib uted in
many de vel op ing coun tries. A key fac tor trig ger ing
“peas ant wars” of the twen ti eth cen tury was sub sis  -
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that they had noth ing more to lose and no where else 
to go. In Al ge ria, China, Mex ico, Rus sia, and Viet
Nam sub sis tence cri ses and strug gle for land by
peas ant cul ti va tors fol lowed years of dep ri va tion,
mar ginali za tion, and abuse by domi nant po liti cal
in ter ests. Ac cord ing to Wolf (1969), po liti cal edu  -
ca tion and consciousness- raising have also played a 
role by af ford ing in di vidu als in op pressed groups
an op por tu nity to ally with urban in ter ests, to ques  -
tion their cir cum stances, and to per ceive pos si ble
po liti cal open ings to over turn un just re gimes. The
wars of the early twen ti eth cen tury also de pended
on some cos mopol itani za tion, plus im proved ac cess
to out side sources of in for ma tion and ma te rial
 resources, in clud ing arms.
The civil wars of the late twen ti eth cen tury also
can be viewed as re sponses to lin ger ing co lo nial
lega cies of ra cism and political- economic dis crimi  -
na tion. Again, trig ger causes are often sub sis tence
cri ses. In Ethio pia, Rwanda, and Sudan, gov ern ment
re gimes were fi nally top pled when they  responded
in ade quately to fam ine situa tions they had helped
cre ate. Un for tu nately, none of these wars im me di  -
ately im proved sub sis tence con di tions; in stead, all
mag ni fied suf fer ing and food short ages. In El Sal va  -
dor, Gua te mala, and Nica ra gua, pro tracted civil wars 
fol lowed pro tracted food cri ses and human rights
abuses. Or di nar ily, such wars would have been lim  -
ited by the need for lead ers on both sides to as sure a
sub sis tence base for their sup port ers. Un for tu nately,
civil wars dur ing the Cold War and post–Cold War
era have per sisted for dec ades be cause po liti cal and
hu mani tar ian re gimes have pro vided both food and
mili tary aid that keep con flicts alive.
Whereas sim ple mod els of en vi ron mental de  -
terminism (such as those ar ticu lated by neo-
 Malthusians) in ter pret popu la tion pres sure and en vi  -
ron mental re source scar ci ties to lead in evi ta bly to
war fare, ill ness, star va tion, and death, more  nuanced
mod els such as those of Wolf (1969) and Homer-
 Dixon (1991, 1995) sug gest that there must be pres  -
ent ad di tional forces, such as abuses of human rights
and so cial ine quali ties, plus cul tural val ues that in sist 
that such goings- on are un just and in tol er able and
best ad dressed by vio lent ac tion. Ac cord ing to these
mod els, vio lent strug gles arise as much from per cep  -
tions of un fair ness as from ab so lute short ages. High
popu la tion den si ties in re gions of low natu ral re  -
source avail abil ity do not auto mati cally or natu rally
en gen der vio lent con flict.
Homer- Dixon (1991, 1994, 1995, 1995–96)
sug gests that be fore World War II, many vio lent
con flicts were the re sult of rela tively sim ple in ter  -
state com pe ti tions for key re sources, such as land
and water. Con flicts over the last 50 years, how  -
ever, have tended to be what Homer- Dixon calls
group- identity con flicts, which arise where newly
ar rived mi grant groups com pete with an origi nal
resi dent group for ex ist ing re sources, es pe cially in
emer gent mul ti na tional states. Op pos ing groups rarely
act alone, but en list out side po liti cal ac tors, ei ther
neigh bor ing states or in ter na tional forces, to per -
petu ate the vio lence. Vio lence also oc curs when a
domi nant group de nies re sources and causes scar ci  -
ties for per sons who are eco nomi cally or cul tur ally
mar ginal ized. The mar ginal ized group, in frus tra  -
tion, views those who visi bly con trol greater wealth 
and power as the source of their des ti tu tion and
 oppression. When their de mands for greater po liti  -
cal power and con trol over re sources go unmet,
they are ripe for vio lence.
The trig ger con di tion for vio lent con flict may
be natu ral, such as a pro longed drought that re duces 
their status from bad to worse, or po liti cal, such as a
re duc tion in so cial wel fare pro grams or an in crease
in the tax bur den on the mar ginal ized group.
Homer- Dixon’s case his to ries also sug gest that
food in se cu rity usu ally ac com pa nies the move ment
from con di tions of per ceived en vi ron mental scar ci  -
ties to con flict. By dev as tat ing land and water
 resources, de mol ish ing so cial in sti tu tions and mar  -
kets, and cre at ing short ages of capi tal and trained
man power, vio lent con flicts ex ac er bate con di tions
of en vi ron mental scar city and com pe ti tion for
 resources, cre at ing the po ten tial for ad di tional or
 unending con flict. Armed vio lence usu ally de stroys 
so cial in fra struc ture that oth er wise might allow
 political re forms and eco nomic growth as so lu tions
to natu ral re source scar ci ties (Homer- Dixon 1991).
Relig ious, Eth nic, and Ideo logi cal
Dif fer ences
Vio lent con flict in the late twen ti eth cen tury has
been as much ideo logi cally as eco nomi cally mo ti  -
vated and usu ally framed and fought in re lig ious or
po liti cal terms. In Iran the suc cess ful over throw of
10the Shah by Shi’ite Mus lims was a pro test against
eco nomic and civil- political human rights abuses
by peas ants and poor urban work ers who were de  -
prived and hun gry. But the revo lu tion was framed
as a re lig ious move ment that joined the dis ad van  -
taged with eco nomi cally better- off ele ments ad vo  -
cat ing a fun da men tal ist Is lamic state over and
against cor rupt ing West ern and secu lar in flu ences.
In Sudan coups and coun ter coups since the 1950s
usu ally have been re sponses to the gov ern ment’s
in abil ity to re spond ef fec tively to fam ine. But con  -
flict lines are drawn ra cially, eth ni cally, and re lig  -
iously, pit ting north ern Arab Is lamic in ter ests
against south ern Su da nese Af ri can Chris tian or ani  -
mist in ter ests, in a drawn- out strug gle for con trol
over land, water, and oil, in ad di tion to the hearts
and minds of peo ple.
Fam ine was an ini tial trig ger of the mul tidecade 
Ethio pian civil war that origi nated in the 1974 over  -
throw of Haile Se las sie’s cor rupt re gime by the
Der gue, a so cial ist junta. But the worst fam ine fol  -
lowed rather than pre cipi tated the ini tial vio lence,
as the Der gue lead er ship forci bly re set tled whole
eth nic popu la tions and de nied them emer gency
food when they could not pro duce food for them  -
selves. Civil war along re gional and eth nic lines
con tin ued, with out side as sis tance, for an other
20 years as Eri trean in ter ests sought in de pend ence
from Ethio pian rule and Ti grayan forces strug gled
for lead er ship within the Ethio pian pol ity that re  -
mained. Hard ship and food in se cu rity were al ways
part of the pic ture, but eth nic and po liti cal fac tors
were proba bly more in flu en tial on the par ticu lar
form the con flict took.
In Latin Ameri can and other Af ri can con flicts,
un der ly ing struc tural vio lence is gen er ally framed
more in political- economic than in re lig ious terms.
Cen tral Ameri can revo lu tion ary strug gles are for
land and so cial jus tice. They pit rul ing elites, strug  -
gling to main tain power, against the in dige nous and 
mes tizo poor, who seek en vi ron mental re sources,
fair wages, an end to state ter ror, and a po liti cal
 regime with out ra cism that pro tects human rights.
Sig nifi cantly, Latin Ameri can elite at ti tudes of so  -
cial su pe ri or ity have proved so in grained that left ist
revo lu tion ary lead er ship has proved as in ca pa ble
as the forces they over threw of re vers ing so cial  in  -
jus tice and im prov ing in dige nous and lower- class
ac cess to land, so cial serv ices, and op por tu ni ties
(Mac Don ald 1988; Bar ra clough 1989). Cen tral
Ameri can strug gles also pit ted Catho lic re form ers
against en trenched ec cle si as ti cal elites, and Prot es  -
tants against Catho lics in   religious dis putes that frac  -
tured com mu ni ties but  always had an un der ly ing
political- economic di men sion.
Simi larly, Af ri can and Mid dle East ern strug  -
gles for con trol over water and re lated land re -
sources have led to bor der wars be tween Mau ri ta nia 
and Sene gal and Is rael and Pal es tine, but these con  -
flicts are an chored in eth nic, re lig ious, and po liti cal
ideo logi cal dif fer ences.
South east Asian con flicts in Cam bo dia and
Myan mar (for merly Burma) involve a mix of
mate rial and ideo logi cal fac tors. Sri Lanka’s
Tamil- Sinhalese civil war is rooted in a strug gle
for land but fanned by ethnic- religious con flict.
India’s regional con flict in Kashmir is a strug gle
by the local popu la tion for relig ious auton omy as
much as for land. Simi larly, Indo ne sia’s con flict
in East Timor is moti vated by the Indo ne sian gov  -
ern ment’s desire to con trol not only Timo rese
mate rial resources, but also the popu la tion’s soci  -
ety and cul ture.
War ring states and fac tions of the former So viet 
Union and Yugo sla via dem on strate seeth ing eth nic
and re lig ious con flict un der ly ing strug gles for land
and po liti cal con trol over re sources per ceived
to be lim ited. Pro tracted con flicts in Ar me nia,
 Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Geor gia, Tajiki stan, and the
former Yugo sla via il lus trate com bined cultural-
 religious and political- economic fac tors un der ly ing
con flict over who will con trol these ter ri to ries in the 
post–Cold War pe riod. As a re sult, for merly food
self- sufficient or self- reliant areas are now en tirely
de pend ent on food aid.
Some of these con flicts—Armenia- Azerbaijan
is a case in point—also involve oil. Con trol over
oil devel op ment and reve nues was a major fac tor
in the Biafran- Nigerian civil war (1967–70), the
Suda nese civil war, and the mul ti ple wars in the
Mid dle East, most recently the Per sian Gulf War.
Oil explains out side inter ests in these local con  -
flicts but the wars them selves are framed in eth nic
and politi cal terms that usu ally include desire
by local lead er ship for auton omy to profit from oil 
reve nues.
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Cause or Cure of Con flict?
As the situa tions de scribed il lus trate, an im por tant
un der ly ing cause of con flict is per ceived re source
scar city. One im por tant ra tion ale of West ern de vel  -
op ment and es pe cially food and ag ri cul tural aid
since World War II has been to im prove the re source
base of un der privi leged popu la tions and thereby
thwart revo lu tion ary po ten tial. Dur ing the height of
the Cold War (1960s–80s), West ern  donors fi nanced 
a Green Revo lu tion in sta ple food crops partly to
 assuage dis con tent and head off com mu nist revo lu  -
tions in poli tics. The U.S.-Latin Ameri can Al li ance
for Pro gress and P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) in the
1960s used food and eco nomic  assistance as a tool
to pre vent hun ger and dis con tent. The U.S. gov ern  -
ment hoped pro grams would pro mote demo cratic
and eco nomic re forms and pre vent armed (com mu  -
nist)  uprisings. In the 1980s and 1990s, many ana -
lysts have ar gued that aid tar geted at over com ing
hun ger can sty mie po ten tial for  violence in war-
 prone Af ri can, Asian, and Latin Ameri can coun tries
(IFPRI 1995, 1996). Geo graphic early warn ing sys  -
tems for fam ine de tec tion and re sponse are an other
de vel op ment  assistance mecha nism to pre vent food
in se cu rity,  environmental re source de ple tion, com  -
pe ti tion, and con flict. Other de vel op ment ini tia tives
to pro mote eco nomic growth, lib er al ize trade, man  -
age popu la tion growth, and im prove pub lic health
and en vi ron ment aim to in crease wealth and well-
 being, and thereby re duce con flict po ten tial.
Un for tu nately, much de vel op ment aid is mis  -
guided and, even more than ne glect, serves as a
source of dis con tent and political- economic de sta  -
bi li za tion. From the per spec tive of “food first”
 advocates (Lappé and Col lins 1978; FIAN 1997,
1998), West ern de vel op ment con cepts and for eign
aid are more prob lem than so lu tion for food in se cu -
rity. They criti cize ag ri cul tural de vel op ment, par  -
ticu larly cash crop ping and food as sis tance in
 developing coun tries, for thwart ing community- led
de vel op ment that would put food first. Pro vid ing
for ade quate food and op ti mum human de vel op  -
ment, they argue, are not ques tions of de vel op ing
the right tech nolo gies or get ting in ter na tional grain
and other ag ri cul tural com mod ity prices right, but
ques tions of bring ing about en ti tle ments, so cial jus  -
tice, and em pow er ment of the dis ad van taged. If
poor peo ple had fairer ac cess to re sources, from
land to edu ca tion, there would be no food prob lems. 
They argue that lib er al ized trade poli cies leave poor 
peo ple vul ner able to food im port and crop ex port
price fluc tua tions be yond their con trol. From a
food- first per spec tive, “popu la tion” and “scar city”
are both de vel op ment myths that good poli cies
should be able to get be yond.
3
Debt, a prod uct of years of mis man aged gov  -
ern ment spend ing, adds to developing- country eco -
nomic and fi nan cial bur dens. Be gin ning in the
1980s, debt re pay ment schemes have been part of
in ter na tional fi nan cial in sti tu tions’ de mands for
gov ern ments to put for eign ex change earn ings
rather than “food first.” In ter na tional Mone tary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank de mands for struc tural 
ad just ment of developing- country econo mies and
gov ern ance, al though they ad dress needed re forms,
can dis ad van tage needy citi zens as gov ern ments cut 
so cial serv ices and food sub si dies, at least in the
short run, to meet con di tions for ad di tional loans.
4
Susan George, a critic of in ter na tional de vel op ment
and fi nan cial poli cies, has la beled debt “a fate
worse than death” and with oth ers has ar gued for
debt re lief and gov ern ment guar an tees of the human 
right to food. She, with oth ers, in ter prets the fail ure
to achieve free dom from hun ger for all as both a
source of con flict and a fail ure of basic human
rights (George 1990a,b, 1992; Messer 1996b).
Peace stud ies (such as Smith 1994) and food
and eco nomic stud ies (such as Stewart 1993) have
docu mented that debt and struc tural ad just ment
bur dens cor re late with con flict. Struc tural ad just  -
ment loans are one in di ca tor of high debt bur den, in
that they are con di tional on eco nomic re forms and
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3 Adapted from Messer with Uvin 1996.
4 Struc tural ad just ment re forms and debt re pay ment schemes re quire states to cut wel fare pro grams, re duce pub lic spend ing, and cut
or pri vat ize many pub lic serv ices; lib er al ize trade to force do mes tic ag ri cul ture and i n dus try to com pete more ef fec tively in the in ter  -
na tional econ omy; struc ture eco nomic poli cies more fa vora bly for ex port and en tre pre neu rial ac tivi ties that can help earn for eign ex  -
change; and ac cel er ate the pro cess of draw ing all eco nomic and so cial sec tors into the in t er na tional and mar ket econ omy (adapted
from Smith 1994, 12).predi cated on the re cipi ent’s hav ing ex pe ri enced
some dif fi culty with debt re pay ments. Evi dence
link ing debt with con flict (based on 1993 con flict
data) shows that of 71 de vel op ing coun tries that
 received ad just ment loans, 50 were ex pe ri enc ing
con flict (Smith 1994, 12–13). In ad di tion, of the top 
25 developing- country debt ors, whether meas ured
by gross ex ter nal debt or debt serv ice ratio, 22 were
con flict coun tries. Im pos ing aus ter ity meas ures
where most peo ple al ready have too lit tle eco nomic
se cu rity has con trib uted to so cial un rest in Ar gen  -
tina, Hon du ras, Mex ico, Peru, the Phil ip pines,
Vene zuela, and many Af ri can coun tries (Smith
1994, 23–26).
Spe cific cases such as Rwanda (Uvin 1996a,d),
So ma lia (Maren 1997), and Zaire (now the Demo  -
cratic Re pub lic of Congo) show how for eign aid,
par ticu larly in Af rica, some times props up abu sive
re gimes and leaves un scru pu lous lead ers free to
pur sue preda tory or ne glect ful poli cies. The case of
Rwanda in par ticu lar shows how de clin ing food
self- sufficiency may re flect small farm ers’ de clin  -
ing en ti tle ments to land and other re sources and
their in creas ing vul ner abil ity to price fluc tua tions
for their main cash crops, such as cof fee (see Box 2
on p. 24). Ex am ples of mis man aged de vel op ment
aid as a source of food in se cu rity and con flict are
found also in Asia and Latin Amer ica (see, for ex  -
am ple, White ford and Fer gu son 1991).
Cal cu lat ing the Costs
of Con flict
Con flict wastes lives, live li hoods, en vi ron mental
re sources, and ma te ri als. Al though in cer tain cases,
as with the United States in World War II, war has
been cred ited with re viv ing the econ omy, stimu lat  -
ing pro duc tion, and re duc ing un em ploy ment, in
most cases, the prod ucts (and many of the peo ple)
are de stroyed.
Costs in Lives, Live li hoods,
and Mili tary Spend ing
War fare over the last 20 years has cost up to a mil  -
lion lives per year, and most of the casu al ties are
 civilians, not com bat ants. Es ti mates of deaths
 directly re lated to the fight ing in wars run as low as
5 per cent in the civil wars in An gola and Mo zam  -
bique, al though more than a mil lion per sons died in
each of these con flicts. Lack of food and health
care, plus the trau mas of dis place ment, kill many
more than ac tual com bat (Green 1994).
The mone tary costs of con flict are con ven tion  -
ally tal lied in lost live li hoods, destroyed prop er ties,
and mone tary needs for imme di ate relief and longer-
 term recon struc tion. In addi tion, gov ern ments forgo 
invest ments in peace time serv ices and eco nomic
out puts and may suf fer addi tional losses in high for  -
eign exchange rates as they seek to con tain bor der  -
ing hos tili ties. Green (1994) and Green and Mavie
(1994) sug gest the large scale of out put for gone,
 expenditures diverted, and for eign exchange bur  -
dens indi rectly related to the con flicts of south ern
Africa, but they also show the dif fi cul ties of pre cise
cal cu la tion. For Mozam bique, the cumu la tive loss
of out put due to the strug gle between the gov ern  -
ment and Renamo insur gents proba bly exceeded
US$20 bil lion from 1982 to 1992. Pro duc tion losses 
were due to the deaths of some 1.5 mil lion peo ple
and the removal of over half of the popu la tion from
cus tom ary sources of live li hood (1.5 to 2 mil lion
were inter na tional refu gees, 2 mil lion were inter -
nally dis placed into camps or reset tle ment schemes, 
2 mil lion were dis placed but not into for mal set tle  -
ments, and more than 1 mil lion were liv ing in the
vicin ity of their ruined vil lages but were socio  -
economically or psy cho logi cally dis placed) (Green
and Mavie 1994, 78). The war also inflicted direct
dam age on mar kets, com mu ni ca tions, pub lic health 
serv ices, and other infra struc ture. Destruc tion of
capi tal stock led to con tinu ing losses of out put with
difficult- to- calculate impacts on income flow and
mul ti plier effects. The con flict also drew enor mous
mili tary invest ments from neigh bor ing Tan za nia and
Zim babwe. It is esti mated that Tan za nia invested
$5 bil lion in mili tary spend ing over the 30- year
 period 1961–91, which included Mozam bique’s
prior lib era tion war against Por tu gal. This expen di  -
ture imposed high costs on the Tan za nian popu lace
in terms of lost food secu rity and health care due
to the diver sion of poten tial gov ern ment resources
away from agri cul tural and medi cal facili ties and
train ing. Such losses pale in com pari son with
Mozam bique’s dev as ta tion but still point to con sid  -
er able regional effects beyond the imme di ate con -
flict (Green 1994, 40).
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sus so cial ex pen di tures by con sid er ing in vest ments
in weap ons as al ter na tives to health and nu tri tion
ex pen di tures. From 1960 to 1994, arms im ports by
de vel op ing coun tries to taled US$775 bil lion (in
1987 dol lars). The enor mity of waste in human
lives is shown most dra mati cally not in mone tary
terms, but in limbs lost to an ti per son nel land mines.
An es ti mated 100 mil lion an ti per son nel land mines
lit ter 69 coun tries; more than 10 mil lion mines lie in 
Af ghani stan, An gola, Egypt, and Iran. Cam bo dia is
es ti mated to have 1 mine for every per son in a
popu la tion of 10 mil lion, and 1 of every 236 per  -
sons is an am pu tee (Si vard 1996, 15). Land mines
that pre vent farm ing and trade con trib ute to food
 insecurity fol low ing war fare and in turn to scar ci  -
ties that con trib ute to con tinu ing con flict po ten tial.
Clear ing an ti per son nel mines is both tech ni cally
dif fi cult and ex pen sive—an other cost of con flict.
Po liti cal ana lysts also speak of far- reaching
po liti cal costs of con flict in de vel op ing coun tries.
The most im por tant of these is proba bly the un der  -
min ing of the in flu ence of the United Na tions,
which is seen as hav ing failed to in ter vene ef fec  -
tively, and to a lesser ex tent, the In ter na tional Fed  -
era tion of the Red Cross, which seems to have
been pow er less to de liver aid in the case of East
Timor (Cranne 1994).
In 1986, Willi Brandt chas tised NATO coun  -
tries for plac ing mili tary and space pro gram spend  -
ing over for eign de vel op ment as sis tance (Brandt
1986). With the end of the Cold War, arms spend  -
ing may fi nally be in de cline, but emer gency as sis  -
tance for zones of armed con flict con tin ues to
 hijack for eign as sis tance budg ets that over all are
shrink ing in re sponse to eco nomic down turns and
do mes tic pres sures to cut budg ets and “wel fare”
spend ing (Mar chione 1996).
Declin ing Devel op ment Assis tance
and Esca lat ing Emer gency Needs
De spite the some time mis al lo ca tion, mis man age  -
ment, and poli ti ci za tion of de vel op ment as sis tance, 
aid can sup port eq ui ta ble and sus tain able de vel op  -
ment. For eign as sis tance has con trib uted to gains in 
child sur vival, life ex pec tancy, and edu ca tional
 attainment in the de vel op ing world over the past
sev eral dec ades. For most of the poorer de vel op ing
coun tries, aid re mains an es sen tial tool for as sur ing 
that eve ry one has ac cess to food, basic edu ca tion,
pri mary health care, fam ily plan ning serv ices,
clean water, and safe sani ta tion. In 1996 of fi cial
de vel op ment as sis tance from all sources to taled
only US$58.2 bil lion, down 14.5 per cent in real
dol lars terms from 1991 (OECD 1998). Within this
di min ish ing aid budget, an in creas ing pro por tion of 
both total as sis tance and food aid was di rected to
emer gen cies. In 1996 emer gency as sis tance came
to $5.5 bil lion, or 9.5 per cent of all aid, com pared
with just 3.5 per cent in 1987. In 1993 and 1994,
emer gency as sis tance peaked at 11 per cent of all
aid (Fig ure 1).
As sis tance from the 21 mem bers of the Or gani sa  -
tion for Eco nomic Co- operation and De vel op ment’s
De vel op ment As sis tance Com mit tee (OECD/ DAC)
ac counted for 95 per cent of all aid in 1996 (OECD
1998). Al though the total rose by 5 per cent in real
dol lar terms from 1995 to 1996, it was still 9 per  -
cent lower than in 1992 in con stant dol lars.
The end of the Cold War de prived do nors of a
pow er ful po liti cal mo tive, and the share of the
“peace divi dend” de voted to de vel op ment as sis  -
tance was less than hoped (Lake 1990). Mean while, 
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Figu re 1— Emergency assistance as a share of 
official development assistance,
1987–96
Source:Or gani sa tion for Eco nomic Co op era tion and De vel op ment,
De vel op ment Co op era tion Di rec tor ate, vari ous years.former com mu nist states in Cen tral and East ern
Europe and the former So viet Union, many of them
in or close to con flict, re ceived more than US$10
bil lion in aid in 1995 (the last year for which in for  -
ma tion is avail able), drain ing funds from poorer
coun tries. Aid to Sub- Saharan Af rica, where most
of the poor est coun tries and sev eral major con flict
zones are lo cated, fell from $18.9 bil lion in 1994 to
$16.8 bil lion in 1996, a de cline of 11 per cent. Al  -
though the flow of pri vate funds from DAC mem  -
ber coun tries to the de vel op ing world ($234 bil lion) 
far ex ceeded aid and other con ces sional flows from
DAC mem ber gov ern ments and mul ti lat eral or gani  -
za tions ($66 bil lion) in 1996, de vel op ment as sis  -
tance re mains the most sig nifi cant chan nel of funds
for poor coun tries (OECD 1998).
Food aid is also drop ping pre cipi tously; total
ton nage from all do nors de clined 23 per cent in 1996 
and fell 57 per cent be tween 1993 and 1996. On
 average in the mid- 1990s, 35 per cent of this greatly
re duced ton nage went to meet emer gency needs;
in the 1970s, emer gency re lief ac counted for only
about 10 per cent of all food aid (USAID 1998). The
WFP has seen an even more dra matic trans for ma  -
tion of its ac tivi ties: in 1996, emer gency op era tions
and pro tracted feed ing of refu gees and other dis  -
placed per sons claimed 68 per cent of WFP food aid
ton nage, whereas a dec ade ear lier, two- thirds of
WFP as sis tance had gone into de vel op ment ef forts
such as school feed ing, ma ter nal and child health
proj ects, and food- for- work. Emer gency op era tions 
in Rwanda and the former Yugo sla via and feed ing
of refu gees and dis placed per sons in Af ghani stan
and Li be ria alone claimed one of every three tons
shipped by WFP in 1996 (WFP 1998).
Al though aid of fi cials try to make re lief func  -
tion as de vel op ment as sis tance, the “relief- to-
 development con tin uum” they talk about ap pears to 
be more wish ful think ing than fact. The bulk of
emer gency food as sis tance is de voted to meet ing
basic human wel fare needs.
Since the end of the Sec ond World War, the
United States has tended to set global de vel op ment
as sis tance trends. In the 1990s, U.S. aid has led the
pat tern of grow ing slices of emer gency aid com ing
out of a shrink ing over all as sis tance pie. In fis cal
year 1996, U.S. bi lat eral emer gency as sis tance
came to US$1.35 bil lion (US$449 mil lion in food
aid, US$181 in cash dis as ter as sis tance, and
US$721 mil lion in refu gee aid) or 39 per cent of the
US$3.48 bil lion aid budget. Cash de vel op ment
 assistance that same year to taled $1.68 bil lion, and
the United States pro vided $445 mil lion worth of
development- oriented food aid. This rep re sents
 almost a dou bling of total U.S. emer gency aid from
US$786 mil lion in fis cal 1989, al though a slight de  -
cline from the high fig ure of US$2.2 bil lion in fis cal 
1993. But over all aid re sources fell 24 per cent be -
tween fis cal 1985 and fis cal 1995. To meet emer  -
gency needs, U.S. poli cy mak ers di verted re sources
from global child sur vival ini tia tives and pro grams
for sus tain able de vel op ment in Af rica (Cohen
1995; USAID 1997).
Global aid from NGOs is simi larly tar geted
more to dis as ter areas than to re gions that are
 impoverished but peace ful. In the mid- 1990s,
such agen cies as OXFAM United King dom and
OXFAM Ire land, whose aim is long- term im prove  -
ment of human con di tions, were de vot ing 50 per  -
cent of their re sources to areas of con flict, and in
Af rica, 70 per cent (Cranne 1994).
This pro lif era tion of emer gency needs and
squeeze on de vel op ment as sis tance are likely to
con tinue, al though re duc tions in de vel op ment aid
cut pro grams that might help house holds and com  -
mu ni ties in resource- poor coun tries be come more
food se cure and less prone to con flict. The U.S.
Agency for In ter na tional De vel op ment (USAID)
rec og nizes that “sus tain able de vel op ment that cre  -
ates chains of en ter prise, re spects the en vi ron ment,
and en larges the range of free dom and op por tu nity
over gen era tions should be pur sued as the prin ci pal
an ti dote to so cial dis ar ray” (At wood 1994), but
USAID also faces shrink ing budg ets.
Within shrink ing budg ets, in ter na tional ag ri  -
cul tural re search is suf fer ing cuts and is in creas  -
ingly forced to com pete with pro grams sup port ing
the com ple men tary goals of en vi ron mental pro tec  -
tion, health and nu tri tional wel fare, live li hood se cu  -
rity, and in fra struc ture de vel op ment. In 1993 the
share of ag ri cul ture in OECD aid fell to less than
8 per cent, down from 12 per cent just four years ear  -
lier (Ran del and Ger man 1996). Cuts in ag ri cul tural 
re search come at a time when all coun tries are fac  -
ing rela tive scar ci ties of land and water, and prob  -
lems of food in se cu rity and en vi ron mental deg ra da  -
tion are grow ing. In many de vel op ing coun tries, the 
gap be tween “resource- poor” and “high- potential”
15areas is grow ing, add ing to per cep tions by those left 
be hind that they are un fairly de prived. Grow ing
popu la tions with out ac cess to tech nolo gies to in ten  -
sify pro duc tion or pro tect the en vi ron ment ripen the 
po ten tial for en vi ron mental de struc tion and con -
flict. Con flict and its af ter math thus con trib ute to
short falls in food meas ur able in terms of costs in
pro duc tion for gone.
Food Pro duc tion For gone
Con flict ac counts for down turns or lower than ex  -
pected val ues in ag ri cul ture, gross do mes tic prod uct, 
and trade. This is be cause con flict di rectly and in di  -
rectly re duces land and water, plant and ani mal
breed ing stocks, human re sources, and fi nan cial
capi tal to in vest in ag ri cul ture, en vi ron mental pro  -
tec tion, and human well- being. Food pro jec tions
through the year 2000 and into the twenty- first cen  -
tury sug gest an ec do tally that  Mozambique, in the
ab sence of con flict, could make south ern Af rica
self- sufficient in rice. Cam bo dia and My an mar
could brighten the out look for Asian rice in the ab  -
sence of conflict- related pro duc tion and mar ket ing
dis rup tions. Be yond an ec do tal evi dence, it is pos si  -
ble to es ti mate roughly the ex tent of food pro duc tion 
losses due to con flict by ex am in ing food pro duc tion
trends in war- torn coun tries. Of spe cial in ter est are
the ex tent of food pro duc tion de clines pos si bly due
to war in south ern Af rica, where the ag gre gate trend
in food pro duc tion per cap ita is down ward.
Quan ti fy ing the Links between
Con flict and Food Pro duc tion
For Sub- Saharan Af rica, pro duc tion sce nar ios are
cal cu lated with and with out con flict as a his tori cal
fac tor from 1970 to 1993.
5 Two meth ods have been
used to com pare ac tual and “peace- adjusted” food
pro duc tion in in di vid ual coun tries and in the re gion
as a whole.
6  The first method in Ta ble 3 ad justs mean
food pro duc tion trends in war- torn Sub- Saharan
 African coun tries. Col umns 3 and 4 show an nual
mean food pro duc tion per cap ita in war- and non war
years for Sub- Saharan coun tries that have had con  -
flicts, and col umn 5 shows the dif fer ence (3–   4) as a
per cent age of non war pro duc tion for each coun try.
The an nual im pact of these dif fer ences on food pro -
duc tion in the re gion as a whole (col umn 7) is cal cu  -
lated by weight ing the con tri bu tion of each coun try’s 
popu la tion to the re gion as a whole.
The sec ond method in Table 4 cal cu lates the
dif fer ences in mean growth in food pro duc tion dur  -
ing war and non war years and their con tri bu tion to
re gional food pro duc tion trends. Col umns 3 and 4
show growth dur ing years of war (be gin ning one
year be fore war) and rela tive peace, and col umn 5
cal cu lates the dif fer ence (3–  4) for each coun try.
An nual im pact of these dif fer ences on food pro duc  -
tion in the re gion as a whole (col umn 7) is again cal  -
cu lated by weight ing the con tri bu tion of each coun  -
try’s popu la tion to the re gion as a whole.
Ta bles 5 and 6 show the total im pact of in ter nal
wars on food pro duc tion lev els for Sub- Saharan Af  -
rica as a whole. Using the mean food pro duc tion
method, Table 5 sub tracts the total im pact on food
pro duc tion for the re gion (col umn 2, de rived from
the mean weighted coun try im pacts in Table 3)
from the ac tual food pro duc tion level ob served for
each year (col umn 1) to reach a peace- adjusted
level of food pro duc tion (col umn 3). This is the
level that shows what food pro duc tion might have
been in the ab sence of con flict in the re gion. The
fig ure for food from peace (col umn 4) shows how
much ad di tional food the re gion might have pro  -
duced in the ab sence of war as a per cent age of its
ac tual pro duc tion.
Using the growth method, Table 6 “peace-
 adjusts” re gional food pro duc tion by re cal cu lat ing
food pro duc tion each year using the ad justed an nual 
growth fig ures shown in pa ren the ses in col umn 3
(these fig ures are de rived from the ad just ments to
an nual growth for each coun try at war shown in col  -
umn 7 of Table 4). Again, “food from peace” re pre-
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5 The meth od ol ogy for quan ti fy ing the links be tween con flict and food pro duc tion was de sig ned and con ducted by Tho mas Mar -
chione of the U.S. Agency for In ter na tional De vel op ment while serv ing as a vis it ing as so ci ate pro fes sor (re search) at the Brown Uni  -
ver sity World Hun ger Pro gram in 1995.
6Data on per cap ita food pro duc tion are from FAO 1994, and the war chro nol ogy is from Si vard 1 993. Al though nei ther source pro  -
vides per fectly re li able data, both of fer suf fi cient in for ma tion to be gin to talk about t rends and scale of im pact. Ta ble 3— Estimated effects of inter nal wars on food production levels, 14 countries, Sub- Sa ha ran Afri ca , 1970–93


















Re gional im pact
(7) = (6 ´  5)
(thou sands) (an nual per cent age)
An gola 10,276 1975–93  94.96 171.16 -44.52 0.02 -0.85
Bu rundi 5,995 1972/1988–93  93.70  99.30 -5.64 0.01 -0.06
Chad 6,010 1980–87  98.13  96.00 2.21 0.01 0.02
Ethio pia 52,981 1974–92  91.65 102.90 -10.93 0.10 -1.08
Ghana 16,446 1981  98.60 109.00 -9.54 0.10 -0.94
Kenya 26,090 1991–92 100.50 104.00 -3.37 0.05 -0.18
Li be ria 2,845 1985–88/1990–93  75.20 101.00 -25.54 0.01 -0.14
Mo zam bique 15,322 1981–92 108.30 114.00 -5.00 0.03 -0.14
Ni ge ria 113,901 1980–81/1984/1991–92 109.00 114.00 -4.39 0.21 -0.93
So ma lia 9,517 1988–93  76.82  99.92 -23.12 0.02 -0.41
Su dan 27,407 1984–93  83.34 102.29 -18.53 0.05 -0.94
Uganda 19,248 1971–87 120.12 109.00 10.20 0.04 0.37
Zam bia 8,885 1984  88.00 102.00 -13.73 0.02 -0.23
Zim babwe 10,898 1983–84  85.00 106.00 -19.81 0.02 -0.40
 Sub to tal 326,092
 To tal for Sub- Saharan
  Af rica 537,542    Mean difference  - 12.26
Sources: Si vard 1993; FAO 1994.
Note: n.a. in di cates not avail able.
aRepre sented by mean an nual pro duc tion in all war years.  Pro duc tion data in any one year, and  es pe cially in war years, can be quite in ac cu rate.
b Weights are 1993 coun try popu la tion di vided by 1993 Sub- Saharan Af ri can popu la tion.Ta ble 4— Estimated effects of internal wars on food production growth, 12 countries, Sub- Sa ha ran Afri ca,  1970–93















Re gional im pact
(7) = (6 ´  5)
(thou sands) (an nual per cent age growth) (an nual per cent age)
An gola 10,276 1975–93 -4.33 0 .63 - 4 .96 0.02 -0.09
Bu rundi 5,995 1988–93 -2.27 0 .61 - 2 .88 0.01 -0.03
Chad 6,010 1980–87 -0.70 - 0 .44 - 0 .26 0.01 0.00
Ethio pia 52,981 1974–92 -0.99 - 0 .68 - 0 .31 0.10 -0.03
Kenya 26,090 1991–92 -4.22 0 .20 - 4 .42 0.05 -0.21
Li be ria 2,845 1985–88/1990–93 -7.53 0 .52 - 8 .05 0.01 -0.04
Mo zam bique 15,322 1981–92 -2.87 - 1 .03 - 1 .84 0.03 -0.05
Ni ge ria 113,901 1980–81/1991–92 0.17 - 0 .31  0.48 0.21 0.10
So ma lia 9,517 1988–93 -7.41 - 0 .08 - 7 .35 0.02 -0.13
Su dan 27,407 1984–93 -1.59 - 0 .90 - 0 .69 0.05 -0.04
Uganda 19,248 1971–87 -2.46 1 .08 - 3 .54 0.04 -0.13
Zim babwe 10,898 1983–84 -1.60 - 0 .52 - 1 .08 0.02 -0.02
 Sub to tal 300,751
 To tal for Sub- Saharan
  Af rica 537,542     Mean difference  - 2.91
Sources:Si vard 1993; FAO 1994.
Note: n.a. in di cates not avail able.
aWeights are 1993 coun try popu la tion di vided by 1993 Sub- Saharan Af ri can popu la tion.sents as a per cent age of ac tual pro duc tion the ad di  -
tional food the re gion might have pro duced had
peace pre vailed. The growth method, there fore, ac  -
cu mu lates war’s ef fects on food pro duc tion be cause 
hy po theti cal gains in pro duc tion in one year be  -
come the basis for cal cu lat ing gains in the next year, 
and so forth. In con trast, the mean food pro duc tion
method treats the ef fects of war each year with out
re gard to ef fects in pre vi ous years, al low ing one to
bet ter com pare the ef fects from year to year. Ac tual
and peace- adjusted per cap ita food pro duc tion by
these two meth ods are plot ted in Fig ures 2 and 3.
These meth ods, ad mit tedly rough es ti mates of
coun try and re gional de par tures from his tori cal
food pro duc tion trends, sug gest the ex tent to which
armed con flict has in ter fered with food pro duc tion
in Sub- Saharan Af rica over the pe riod 1970–93 and
the ad di tional quan ti ties of “food from peace” that
might have been avail able had wars been ab sent.
As ex pected, in 13 of 14 coun tries food pro duc  -
tion was lower in war years. Drops were as low as
3.4 per cent in Kenya and as high as 44.5 per cent
in An gola (Table 3). The mean de cline in an nual
pro duc tion was 12.3 per cent. These de creases were
par al leled by short falls in food pro duc tion growth
rates, which were ob served in all coun tries ex cept
Ni ge ria (Table 4). Growth de clined as lit tle as
0.3 per cent in Chad to as much as 8.1 per cent in
 Liberia; the mean was 2.9 per cent.
Such varia tion is ex pected given the widely dif  -
fer ing scope and scale of the con flicts. The cal cu la  -
tions also re flect ex pected dif fer ences in the scale of 
im pacts within and across coun tries. The im pact of
An go la’s war on the coun try and re gion is very
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Table 5— Esti ma ted regio nal impact of inter nal wars on food pro duc tion levels (mean food
production method), Sub- Sa ha ran Afri ca, 1970–93
Year
In dex of
ac tual per ca pi ta
food pro duc tion
(1979–81 = 100)
(1)
Re gio nal im pact
of in ter nal wars
on food pro duc tion
(2)
In dex of
pea ce- ad jus ted
per ca pi ta






(per cent age of
 ac tual pro duc tion)
1970 120.5 0 120.5 0.00
1971 117.2 0.40 116.8 -  0.34
1972 111.8 0.34 111.5 -  0.30
1973 110.5 0.40 110.1 -  0.36
1974 113.5 -  0.71 114.2 0.63
1975 112.6 -2.17 114.8 1.92
1976 108.1 -2.17 110.3 2.00
1977 105.8 -2.17 108.0 2.05
1978 104.3 -2.17 106.5 2.08
1979 101.2 -2.17 103.4 2.14
1980  99.1 -3.20 102.3 3.23
1981  99.8 -3.68 103.5 3.69
1982  98.3 -2.31 100.6 2.35
1983  94.7 -2.73  97.4 2.88
1984  92.1 -4.99  97.1 5.42
1985  96.3 -3.41  99.7 3.54
1986  98.1 -3.41 101.5 3.47
1987  93.7 -3.41  97.1 3.64
1988  98.5 -  4.24 102.7 4.30
1989  97.6 -  4.17 101.8 4.27
1990  95.7 -4.47 100.2 4.67
1991  95.7 -5.53 101.2 5.78
1992  92.8 -5.20  98.0 5.60
1993  92.9 -2.89  95.8 3.12
Source: Cal cu lated by World Hun ger Pro gram, Brown Uni ver sity, Provi dence, R.I., U.S.A., from data in  FAO 1994.large, twice as great as that of Zim babwe, which ex  -
pe ri enced less dis rup tion in food pro duc tion (Table
3). The Ethio pian war had a me dium im pact on the
coun try’s an nual pro duc tion com pared with other
coun tries in the re gion, but its re gional im pact is
mag ni fied to 1 per cent for each year of war be cause
of its size. The mas sive food as sis tance re quire  -
ments of both An gola and Ethio pia dur ing and im  -
me di ately fol low ing their war years ver ify the
large- scale dis rup tions. The cal cu la tions also show
the ag gre gate ef fect of large num bers of wars on
both food pro duc tion and growth dur ing and im me  -
di ately fol low ing the Cold War years.
Ad just ing re gional food pro duc tion for peace
re verses nei ther the gen eral down ward pro duc tion
trends for the re gion nor the ob vi ous ef fects of the
major droughts of 1974, 1984, and 1992. But the
ad just ment does dampen the ef fects. By the mean
food pro duc tion method the great est gain would
have been nearly 6 per cent in 1991 (Fig ure 2). The
costs of con flict are more graphi cally ap par ent by
the growth method, which shows pro duc tion  gaps
wid en ing with each dec ade: from zero to 1 per cent  in 
the 1970s; 1.3 to 3.5 per cent in the 1980s; and 3.9 to 
5.3 per cent in the 1990s (Fig ure 3).
In in ter pret ing these data cer tain ca ve ats are
in order. The FAO country- level data (like other
sta tis ti cal sources) are not very re li able. Even in
or di nary times, but es pe cially in times of cri sis,
data col lec tion and re port ing tech niques lack ac cu -
racy, miss varia tions within coun tries, and often
fail to take into  account sig nifi cant con tri bu tions
of the  informal econ omy, es pe cially ac tiv ity in
par al lel mar kets.
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Table 6— Esti ma ted regio nal impact of inter nal wars on food pro duc tion (growth method),
Sub-Saha ran Afri ca, 1970–93
Year
In dex of
ac tual per ca pi ta











pea ce- ad jus ted








(per cent age of
ac tual pro duc tion)
1970 121 121
1971 117 (-2.8) -  0.13 117 (-2.7) 0.1
1972 112 (-  4.8) -  0.16 112 (-  4.7) 0.0
1973 111 (-1.2) -  0.13 111 (-1.0) 0.1
1974 114 (2.6) -  0.16 114 (2.8) 0.2
1975 113 (-  0.8) -  0.25 113 (-  0.5) 0.4
1976 108 (-  4.2) -  0.25 109 (-3.9) 0.5
1977 106 (-2.2) -  0.25 107 (-1.9) 0.7
1978 104 (-1.4) -  0.25 105 (-1.2) 1.0
1979 101 (-3.1) -  0.25 102 (-2.8) 1.1
1980 99.1 (-2.1) -  0.15 100 (-2.0) 1.3
1981 99.8 (0.7) -  0.21 101 (0.91) 1.5
1982 98.3 (-1.5) -  0.31 100 (-1.2) 1.8
1983 94.7 (-3.8) -  0.33 96.6 (-3.5) 2.0
1984 92.1 (-2.8) -  0.37 94.2 (-2.5) 2.3
1985 96.3 (4.4) -  0.39 98.6 (4.8) 2.4
1986 98.1 (1.8) -  0.39 101 (2.2) 2.8
1987 93.7 (-  4.7) -  0.39 96.5 (-   4.3) 3.0
1988 98.5 (4.9) -  0.42 102 (5.3) 3.1
1989 97.6 (-  0.9) -  0.38 101 (-  0.5) 3.5
1990 95.7 (-2.0) -  0.42 99.5 (-1.6) 3.9
1991 95.7 (0.0) -  0.53 100 (0.5) 4.5
1992 92.8 (-3.1) -  0.53 97.4 (-2.6) 4.9
1993 92.9 (0.1) -  0.33 97.8 (0.4) 5.3
Source: Cal cu lated by World Hun ger Pro gram, Brown Uni ver sity, Provi dence, R.I., U.S.A., from data in  FAO 1994.
aFig ures in pa ren the ses are growth rates (an nual per cent age changes from the year be fore).Moreo ver, the im pact of con flict on food pro -
duc tion is com plex and hard to sepa rate from other
fac tors. The rough cal cu la tions pre sented here lump 
to gether syn er gisms of armed con flict, bad weather, 
human ill ness, or vola tile com mod ity prices on food 
pro duc tion, dis tri bu tion, and con sump tion. In spe -
cific cases such as Ethio pia, Sudan, and most re  -
cently Rwanda, food cri ses due to drought and ag ri  -
cul tural and re lief mis man age ment pre ceded and
trig gered vio lent over throw of their gov ern ments,
only to be fol lowed by even greater food short falls
in the years of con flict that fol lowed.
The cal cu la tions also ag gre gate country- level
data, so they do not iden tify within- country re gional 
short falls and food in se cu rity that re sult from con -
flict or con trib ute to so cial dis con tent. The cen tral
issue in food cri sis is not ag gre gate food pro duc tion
but who has food and who does not. In any food cri  -
sis situa tion, some bene fit rather than suf fer from
se lec tive re gional down turns in food and in come.
The ways in which gov ern ments or oth ers in ter  -
vene to pre vent or re dress food in se cu rity may be
more im por tant for peace than the origi nal short fall
or im pend ing cri sis. Dur ing the 1992 drought, the
So malian gov ern ment ex hib ited lit tle ca pac ity to
re spond, and peo ple re mained mired in fam ine and
con flict. The Hutu gov ern ment in Rwanda re  -
sponded se lec tively, ex clud ing many who sub se  -
quently joined the po liti cal op po si tion and par tici  -
pated in vio lent ac tions. By con trast, more sta ble
gov ern ments in Bot swana and Zim babwe suc cess  -
fully weath ered drought- related food short falls;
their gov ern ments had early warn ing and timely re  -
sponse sys tems in place, and with donor as sis tance,
man aged to stave off cri sis, fam ine, and civil un rest.
Fi nally, the data also raise ques tions that can not 
be an swered with out ad di tional year- by- year scru  -
tiny of the food pro duc tion data; for ex am ple, why
does food pro duc tion ap pear higher in Chad and
Uganda dur ing war years?
Such ca ve ats not with stand ing, the data in
these ta bles in di cate that stag nat ing food pro duc  -
tion and de clin ing growth are closely re lated to
con flict, as ei ther cause or ef fect. But quan ti ta tive
data show only that they are closely linked. At ten -
tion to ad di tional his tori cal data by coun try and
year can help sepa rate out ini tial or se quen tial
cause and ef fect and offer les sons for fu ture con  -
flict pre ven tion.
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Figu re 2— Actual and pea ce- ad jus ted food
pro duc tion in Sub- Sa ha ran Afri ca, 
1970–93, mean food production
method
Source:World Hun ger Pro gram, Brown Uni ver sity, cal cu lated from
FAO 1994.
Figu re 3— Actual and pea ce- ad jus ted food
pro duc tion in Sub- Sa ha ran Afri ca, 
1970–93, growth method
Source:World Hun ger Pro gram, Brown Uni ver sity, cal cu lated from
FAO 1994.3. De-linking Conflict and Hunger
Poli cies for Con flict Pre ven tion
Many vari ables can pre vent coun tries with low or
de clin ing lev els of food se cu rity from mov ing into
con flict. Les sons from cases such as Rwanda can
help pin point the exact link ages be tween food in  -
security and po liti cal cri sis and point out where
emer gency or de vel op ment aid might be cre at ing
or dis si pat ing ten sions (see Box 2). These coun try
sto ries also can help the in ter na tional com mu nity
iden tify early warn ing signs of political- social-
 ethnic cri sis, which, com bined with geo graphic
 information sys tems, might gen er ate more ef fec tive
con flict pre ven tion.
Antici pat ing Con flict:
Early Warn ing Sys tems
To avoid fu ture Rwan das, sys tems for early warn ing 
of and re sponse to po liti cal cri ses need to be ex  -
panded and strength ened, using eco nomic, “cul  -
tural” (eth nic), and other in di ca tors. One ap proach is 
to moni tor and re spond to re source scar ci ties that
can lead to con flict. In Rwanda, fal ling cof fee prices
sig naled a po ten tial cri sis and should have trig gered
the pro tec tion or crea tion of en ti tle ments to as sure
food se cu rity for the many af fected in di vidu als.
In view of Rwan da’s eco logi cal deg ra da tion, eco  -
nomic cri sis, and his tory of vio lence, ex ter nal do  -
nors should have acted ear lier to renew eco nomic
mo men tum and avert a cri sis.
An other moni tor ing ap proach in volves con sult  -
ing with dif fer ent seg ments of the popu la tion
 affected by ob vi ous de clines in pro duc tion or in  -
come. In Rwanda, NGOs and bi lat eral de vel op ment
agen cies could have worked more closely with
former cof fee grow ers to find out how they were
cop ing and help pro vide al ter na tive eco nomic oppor  -
tunities to thwart frus tra tion and hope less ness. Some
in ter na tional de vel op ment spe cial ists were train ing
com mu nity lead ers whose mis sion was to im prove
con di tions and pre vent fu ture scar ci ties, but these
 future lead ers were tar geted and re moved in the ini  -
tial vio lence of 1994. An other role for the in ter na  -
tional com mu nity then is to iden tify and pro tect this
“mid dle ground” from the geno ci dal vio lence of
those who have no in ter est in peace ful de vel op ment
(Kuper 1977, 1985).
A mul ti fac toral method of live li hood moni tor  -
ing com bines food and nu tri tion with com mu nity
and house hold moni tor ing. Save the Chil dren UK
(1977) has in tro duced “risk- mapping” to iden tify
house holds and com mu ni ties vul ner able to food
 crises. This method uses local “key in for mants”
who re port on a large number of live li hood vari  -
ables, for, in ad di tion to food pro duc tion or con  -
sump tion, live stock and other sources of in come
can also plum met in value in years with bad
weather or po liti cal tur moil. Be cause food flows be  -
tween house holds are an im por tant form of pro tec -
tion at the vil lage level, the proj ect also aims to
meas ure the de gree of re dis tri bu tion that takes place 
in an or di nary or a bad year. This meas ure ment is
an other way to iden tify house holds vul ner able to
hun ger. This method could cap ture cri sis fac tors
such as the fall in cof fee prices since it fol lows mar  -
kets for key crops and sources of cash in come in
good and bad years.
Human rights or eth no po li ti cal cri sis moni tor  -
ing sug gest ad di tional ave nues. Human rights ad vo  -
cates, such as Human Rights Watch, have as sumed
an ob li ga tion not only to re port, but also to warn of
im pend ing vio lence (Neier 1991). The Mi nori ties at 
Risk Pro ject based at the Uni ver sity of Mary land
has been ana lyz ing the fac tors as so ci ated with
 ethnopolitical con flict in some 280 com mu nal
groups. Each group the proj ect stud ies has at least
100,000 mem bers or ac counts for 1 per cent of the
coun try’s popu la tion and is the sub ject of po liti cal
or so cial dis crimi na tion, the tar get of com mu nal
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Box 2— A case study of Rwanda
Rwanda in the 1990s showed how food inse cu rity can
become a ral ly ing point for politi cal oppo si tion and a trig  -
ger for vio lence. In the early 1990s Rwan da’s eth nic com  -
po si tion was esti mated to be 90 per cent Hutu, 9 per cent
Tutsi, and 1 per cent Twa. In precolo nial times, eth nic
iden tity had not been fixed but rather shift ing, based on
occu pa tion and gene al ogy. In 1899 the Ger man colo nial
author ity imposed Tutsi chiefs in the north and west of the
coun try. After World War I the Bel gians defined eve ry one 
who owned more than 10 cows as Tutsi, kept the Tutsi in
power, and defined eve ry one else as Hutu or Twa. Bel  -
gians then issued iden tity cards, freez ing eth nic iden tity.
Rwanda achieved inde pend ence in 1962, and around that
time many Tutsi fled the coun try to avoid bru tal mas sa cre
at the hands of Hutu mili tias.
Thirty years later the Rwan dan gov ern ment was con  -
trolled by Hutu po liti cal lead ers who fa vored their own
geo graphic and ge nea lo gi cal groups over other Hutu or
Tutsi ele ments. Many Tutsi still were  living in refu gee
camps await ing the right open ing to re turn.
In 1990, Rwanda was clas si fied by de vel op ment ex  -
perts as re source poor, with 95 per cent of the popu la tion in 
ru ral ar eas, the sec ond high est popu la tion growth rate in
Af rica (3.4 per cent to 3.7 per cent per year), and one of the
high est popu la tion den si ties in Af rica (210 to 350 per sons
per square kilo me ter). Re cipi ent of mil lions of dol lars in
for eign as sis tance each year, Rwanda was viewed dif fer  -
ently by dif fer ent ob serv ers. Some saw its im pres sive eco  -
nomic growth de spite lim ited en vi ron mental re sources
and praised Rwan da’s Hutu gov ern ment for hav ing
“coped re marka bly well with land pres sures with out ma  -
jor de te rio ra tion in the agroe co logi cal re source base” and
for hav ing kept ag ri cul tural pro duc tion com men su rate
with popu la tion growth (Ford 1993). Oth ers con demned
the coun try’s hor rific so cial ine quali ties, hu man rights
abuses, and po liti cal cor rup tion and warned that there
would be large- scale up ris ings in re sponse to grow ing
pov erty, hope less ness, and dis sat is fac tion among the
masses (for ex am ple, New bury 1992).
Set ting the con text for dis as ter were cer tain fac tors
beyond the con trol of peo ple or gov ern ment. The price of
cof fee, the prin ci pal source of export crop earn ings, began 
a pre cipi tous decline in 1986, and that was fol lowed in
1989 by the com plete unrav el ing of the inter na tional
 coffee agree ment that had here to fore guar an teed some
meas ure of price sta bil ity and income. In addi tion,
Rwanda was affected by eth nic and politi cal strife in
Burundi, Zaire, and to a lesser extent Tan za nia and
Uganda. The coun try was also sub ject to peri odic
droughts that cut local food pro duc tion.
As a con di tion of con tinu ing in ter na tional aid, do  -
nors were de mand ing that Rwanda adopt struc tural ad just  -
ment meas ures. It ac ceded to these de mands at the ex  -
pense of its al ready lim ited so cial pro grams. Peo ple who
were ex pe ri enc ing a de te rio rat ing stan dard of liv ing as a
re sult of a com bi na tion of en vi ron mental, eco nomic, and
po liti cal fac tors tended to blame their hard ships on the
gov ern ment. De mands by do nors for de cen trali za tion
were met by shift ing some re spon si bil ity for achiev ing
 agricultural in ten si fi ca tion and food self- reliance to lo cal
gov ern ments or NGOs but more lo cal re spon si bil ity was
not met with sub stan tially more re sources.
In invest ment and devel op ment pro grams, the presi  -
dent con tin ued to favor the geo graphic cen ter and north ern 
regions of the coun try where his eth nic rela tions resided.
Pro grams were not designed to improve the lot of small
farm ers, on whom increased pro duc tion and income largely 
depended. Rural pro duc ers who faced sea sonal food
short ages were forced to sell advance crops to mid dle men
for a pit tance to meet imme di ate needs for food and cash
dur ing the hun gry sea son whereas emer gency loan funds
would have allowed them to retain their crops for higher
prices. Con sum ers faced inflated prices for food dur ing
the hun gry sea son and deflated prices for their pro duce
dur ing the post har vest sea son of glut, whereas gov ern  -
ment efforts to smooth out food prices could have
 removed the bur den of high food prices, espe cially for
pro duc ers who were acced ing to gov ern ment urg ings to
spe cial ize in cash and export crops. Exten sion serv ices
offered to farm ers were top down in nature and paid lit tle
atten tion to their needs, desires, and capa bili ties for imple -
ment ing changes. More equal regional dis tri bu tion and
small- scale credit, food- price sta bi li za tion, and improved
research- extension pro grams might have ame lio rated
resource scar city and less ened con flict poten tial, but the
gov ern ment adopted none of these mecha nisms.
Gov ern ment agri cul tural and eco nomic devel op ment 
pro grams also paid scant atten tion to the pre vail ing gen der 
divi sion of labor. Although in the 1980s the Rwan dan
gov ern ment prided itself on attend ing to women’s con  -
cerns, women con tin ued to expe ri ence dis crimi na tion.
They lacked full and equal civil rights before the law; they 
were denied a right to inheri tance; they were mar ginal ized 
from par tici pa tion in deci sion mak ing at all social lev els;
and they lacked fair access to sec on dary and uni ver sity
edu ca tion (New bury 1992, 212). Men con trolled land and
most sur pluses gen er ated by women in agri cul ture or cot -
tage indus try. Although women were respon si ble for most 
daily sub sis tence and car ried out most of the heavy labor
in agri cul ture, men con trolled cash agri cul tural income25
and encoun tered no obli ga tion to con trib ute agri cul tural or
wage income toward house hold sub sis tence (Jefre mo vas
1991). Gov ern ment agri cul tural pro grams tar geted male
farm ers while women’s pro grams focused on sew ing and
knit ting, nutri tion edu ca tion, and vege ta ble gar den ing.
Stud ies con cluded that female income pro duced higher
total house hold food (calo rie) avail abil ity and bet ter
nutri tional out comes for chil dren, espe cially in impov er  -
ished cir cum stances (Ken nedy 1994, 92–93). But women 
still were mar ginal ized in devel op ment plan ning. NGOs,
which tri pled in number between 1982, when there were
144, and 1992, when there were 384 (Maren 1997, 264),
seem to have done lit tle to improve gen der bal ance in
devel op ment ini tia tives.
In sev eral ways, per ceived re source scar ci ties were
as so ci ated with food and nu tri tional in se cu rity. Uvin
(1996a, d), in evalu at ing the re la tion ships in Rwanda
among hun ger, scar city, and vio lence, shows that over
the pe riod 1984–94 to tal food pro duc tion per cap ita fell
by 25 per cent, and in cer tain years there were lo cal or
 regional fam ines. The share of house holds in  extreme
pov erty ap peared to be higher than 50 per cent,  beyond
which an other pro por tion was clas si fied as sim ply poor.
Nu tri tion sur veys in the early 1990s in di cated the pro por  -
tion of ru ral pre school chil dren who were stunted hov  -
ered around 50 per cent (Uvin 1996a, 19–20). By any
meas ure, Rwan dans on the eve of vio lence were food
short, food in se cure, and nu tri tion ally in se cure.
Expla na tions for these hun gry con di tions com monly
high light popu la tion pres sure, land deg ra da tion, and envi  -
ron mental resource deple tion. Parts of Rwanda indeed had
high popu la tion den si ties and were expe ri enc ing intense
com pe ti tion for land, but resource scar ci ties should also be 
con sid ered in light of the coun try’s pol icy con text. Food
pro duc tion defi cits, food inse cu rity, and nutri tional inse cu  -
rity were also prod ucts of mis guided devel op ment poli cies
of the national gov ern ment, which were funded by inter na  -
tional donors. Gov ern ment pro grams favored and enriched 
friends of the rul ing regime, giv ing them land grants at a
time when small farm ers were already expe ri enc ing
shrink age in per cap ita land areas, food, and income, as
well as over all life chances. Oppor tu ni ties were avail able
only to the well con nected; the masses saw no future or
pres ent well- being in farm ing (Uvin 1996a, 27–28). In
addi tion, major agri cul tural dis rup tions and sharp drops in
food pro duc tion were linked to gov ern ment poli cies that
dis placed peo ple from their land base.
Drought was a fac tor in food inse cu rity, but more
sali ent was the gov ern ment’s fail ure to pro vide ade quate
emer gency relief. In 1989–90 Rwanda expe ri enced seri  -
ous food short falls accom pa nied by fam ine in the cen ter,
west, and south. Male agri cul tural work ers forced to
leave in search of food and income became a dis af fected
popu la tion ripe for vio lence.
Con trib ut ing to the dis con tent was the spec ter of cor  -
rupt gov ern ment of fi cials liv ing in lux ury along side Rwan -
dans dev as tated by fam ine, an im age that was widely pub li  -
cized by Hu tus op posed to the gov ern ment. This Hutu
op po si tion was ral ly ing Hutu ele ments and threat en ing the
in cum bent Hutu re gime in 1994 when Tutsi forces in vaded.
In the short term, the gov ern ment saved it self by di vert ing
blame for eco nomic dis ar ray from it self to the Tutsi.
Accord ing to Homer- Dixon (1991, 1995–96), the
Rwan dan geno cide that erupted in 1994 also can be viewed 
as a con ver gence of con flict responses to scar city. The first
was per ceived scar city of land. In 1959–63, Rwan dan Hutu 
forces routed more than half the Tutsi popu la tion and
opened their lands to Hutu colo nists. In 1990 descen dents
of Tutsi refu gees returned as the rebel Rwan dan Patri otic
Front (RPF). As the Tutsi invader set tlers and resi dent
 Hutus com peted for land in par ticu lar regions, many Hutu
joined mili tias or inde pend ently pil laged, plun dered, and
drove out resi dent Tutsi, now broadly iden ti fied with the
inva sion ary force. Hutu were seek ing addi tional lands in
part because gov ern ment appro pria tions had selec tively
reduced hold ings.
The sec ond fac tor was per ceived scar city of live li  -
hood and life chances. The sharp down turn in the econ  -
omy that re sulted from plum met ing cof fee prices added to 
pov erty, job less ness, and a sense of hope less ness among
young peo ple. Gov ern ment as sis tance had al ways been
short, but af ter 1990 it was fur ther re duced be cause up to
40 per cent of the budget was di verted to the mili tary.
In the capi tal city there were up to 1 mil lion refu gees
who had fled the Tutsi in vad ers and were with out work
or pros pects. They of fered a prime breed ing ground for
vio lent ac tion (Af ri can Rights 1995). 
On top of these so cio eco nomic con di tions, vio lence
was also fu eled by ra cism. Hutu elites ac cused all Tut sis of
land grab bing. They re in forced “grass- roots” ra cism that
had been in grained by co lo nial and post colo nial po liti cal,
eco nomic, and edu ca tional in sti tu tions (Uvin 1996a).
Con flict then con trib uted to hun ger. The flight of up
to 2 mil lion Hu tus from prime ag ri cul tural land in 1994
meant an nual crops were not sown. Ag ri cul tural as sets such
as tools and live stock, lo cally adapted seeds, antiero sion
meas ures, and trees were de stroyed, set ting in mo tion mul  -
ti ple years of un der pro duc tion. Con flict con trib uted to the
un rav el ing of the so cial fab ric and greater scar ci ties, mak  -
ing re cov ery and re sil ience dif fi cult or im pos si ble. Each
po liti cal cri sis fur ther ex ac er bated the food cri sis. The RPF
in va sion cre ated thou sands of refu gees, who were then
food in se cure and un able to pro duce food on the best lands. 
Their lack of food pro duc tion, com bined with gov ern ment
do mes tic wel fare cuts in fa vor of the war ef fort, ren dered
oth ers food in se cure. Po liti cal lead ers used the food cri sis
to mo bi lize sup port that re sulted in vio lence that made an
al ready bad situa tion worse.mo bi li za tion ef forts, or both. The proj ect at tempts
to meas ure griev ances, in- group/out- group dif fer  -
ences, other con tex tual char ac ter is tics, and ex  -
trana tional in flu ences (Gurr and Hax ton 1994).
These vari ous early warn ing ap proaches sug  -
gest a check list of in di ca tors for the in ter na tional
com mu nity to moni tor cri sis po ten tial in re source-
 poor or po liti cally vola tile areas:
1. the status of key live li hood fac tors (con di tions of 
food pro duc tion or the price of prin ci pal cash
crops or min er als);
2. the status of key so cial or po liti cal groups, rela -
tive to their his tori cal con texts, con flicts, and
con cerns; and
3. the pre par ed ness of com mu nal, country- level, or 
in ter na tional or gani za tions to pre vent hun ger
and pro vide life sup port serv ices, such as wa ter,
health care, and edu ca tion, to resource- poor
house holds or com mu ni ties in both cri sis and
non cri sis situa tions.
Check lists of early warn ing in di ca tors for par  -
ticu lar lo ca tions might be de signed by local com  -
mu ni ties in con sul ta tion with in ter na tional or gani  -
za tions that would then as sume re spon si bil ity for
check ing the re sults of moni tor ing ef forts and help  -
ing ap peal for re sources when nec es sary.
Al though this check list is meant to moni tor
 preconflict situa tions, simi lar check lists might be
used to moni tor post con flict situa tions. In di ca tors
in clude the status of
1. ma te rial re sources (land, wa ter, wa ter works,
bio logi cal re sources);
2. in fra struc ture (dis tri bu tion mecha nisms, mar  -
kets, roads, com mu ni ca tions);
3. so cial and hu man re sources (com mu nity, re  -
gional, and gov ern ment fa cili ties); and
4. the com bined ma te rial, in fra struc tural, and
 human re sources nec es sary to build in sti tu tions
such as ag ri cul tural re search and ex ten sion ca  -
paci ties.
Rwanda is un usual in that most of the ma te rial
re source base is in tact. In many other cases, de  -
struction and de mor ali za tion of com mu ni ties and
their human re source base make re con struc tion and
re turn to nor malcy much more dif fi cult. With or
with out ma te rial dam age, psy cho logi cal dam age
may also have to be taken into con sid era tion in re  -
con struc tion (An der son and Woodrow 1989).
Rep li cat ing the Les sons of
Peace ful Devel op ment in
Other Resource- Poor Areas
A com ple men tary ap proach to con flict pre ven tion
in volves adapt ing and ap ply ing les sons about
conflict- avoidance from resource- poor but peace ful 
areas that ap pear oth er wise ripe for vio lence. Re  -
gional and com mu nity case stud ies in the Machakos 
dis trict of Kenya, for ex am ple, sug gest that high-
 population- growth, resource- poor areas can make
eco nomic tran si tions with out blood shed (Tiffen,
Mor ti more, and Gi chuki 1994; Ha zell 1995). Such
cases often use in dige nous mecha nisms to regu late
ac cess to land, water, and other re sources and tra di  -
tional cul tural mecha nisms ro re solve con flicts.
Areas such as Machakos also ap pear to take ad van  -
tage of new mar ket and edu ca tional op por tu ni ties,
which in crease their human and eco nomic re -
sources even where the natu ral re source base
 appears to be stag nat ing. Edu ca tion and ac cess to
new mar kets, crops, and tech nolo gies en able peo ple 
to trans form pat terns of land use, crop mixes, and
com merce into vi able re sources that en sure sur vival 
and im prove qual ity of life.
Politi cal resources are also impor tant. Effec  -
tive lead ers both locate new oppor tu ni ties and
con vince peo ple to use them. They impress on
their con stitu ents the social and eco nomic advan  -
tages of peace rela tive to the destruc tive ness of
war and may have to nego ti ate with war ring par ties 
to avoid being drawn into the fight ing. Some com  -
mu ni ties dur ing Soma lia’s active con flict man  -
aged to stay out of the fight ing, and inves ti ga tors
are try ing to learn from the nego tia tion tech niques 
their lead ers used in the midst of these regional
hos tili ties ( Anderson 1995, 1996).
Good lead er ship draw ing on tra di tional com  -
munity mecha nisms can also limit com pe ti tion and
con flict over scarce re sources and con vince peo ple
to with stand short- term dep ri va tion in the in ter est
of longer- term political- economic sta bil ity or gains. 
Suc cess ful com mu nity de vel op ment ef forts build
on com mu ni ties’ in ter nal ca paci ties for sub sis tence
and cash crop pro duc tion in a con text of mu tual
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gal, the grass roots or gani za tion CO LUFIFA
(Comité de Lutte pour la Fin de la Faim), draw ing
on local tra di tion, re lig ion, and gov ern ment, has
helped mem ber vil lages in a re gion of high popu la  -
tion den sity to elimi nate hun ger and im prove stan  -
dards of liv ing through food and cash crop di ver si fi  -
ca tion, care ful mar ket ing, and re li able food stor age. 
Brown Uni ver si ty’s World Hun ger Pro gram has
been ana lyz ing how these peace ful de vel op ment
 alternatives mo bi lize popu la tions to re dress per  -
ceived scar ci ties and “scale up” to im prove liv ing
con di tions (Uvin 1996b).
Suc cess ful cases of peace ful de vel op ment in  -
volve chang ing the ma te rial (often bio logi cal) re  -
source base from one of per ceived scar city to one of 
com para tive ad van tage and chang ing house hold and
com mu nity con texts of hun ger vul ner abil ity to
  realization of greater pro duc tive po ten tial. Al though
such changes might be ex pected to en gen der ad di -
tional com pe ti tion and pos si ble con flict, so cial and
cul tural mores in such suc cess sto ries mili tate
against vio lent out comes and stress fair ness, jus  -
tice, and con flict pre ven tion and reso lu tion.
Ques tions re main, how ever, whether such
mecha nisms can be sal vaged once ac tive con flict
is in prog ress or re vived in post con flict situa tions
where re source pov erty is ex treme and where
human re sources are scarce owing to dis place ments 
and de struc tion.
Con flict Inter ven tion
Ex ter nal as sis tance usu ally is nec es sary to feed
non com bat ants dur ing and after con flict, but emer  -
gency as sis tance re mains prob lem atic. Con sen sus
is emerg ing that the in ter na tional com mu nity has a
right or duty to in ter vene and pro vide hu mani tar ian
as sis tance to en dan gered peo ple, even over the
 objections of a sov er eign state. But the chal lenge is
to find ways to as sist vic tims in situa tions where
one or more par ties to con flict is not open to out side
as sis tance, where emer gen cies are open- ended in
time, and where there is no re li able author ity to
 assume con trol over op era tions or in fra struc ture
so that aid giv ers can eas ily or quickly with draw.
Co or di nat ing the ac tions of in ter gov ern men tal,
gov ern men tal, and NGO aid pro vid ers pres ents an
ad di tional chal lenge.
7 Po liti cal or self- serving in ter -
ests on the part of do nors and NGOs, which are not
bound by gov ern ment legal ob li ga tions, add to the
com plex ity. Les sons learned from drought and
earth quake re sponse and relief- with- development
ef forts can not al ways be trans ferred to po liti cal
emer gen cies, where food is more likely to be used
as a weapon and there is less likely to be an ef fec  -
tive gov ern ment to take on and scale down op era  -
tions after a short pe riod (Walker 1994). So the
 international com mu nity is try ing new prin ci ples
and mili tary ap proaches as it seeks to es tab lish an
ef fec tive global struc ture to co or di nate food aid for
con flict pre ven tion, cri sis re sponse, con flict man  -
age ment, peace mak ing, peace keep ing, and post  -
con flict re con struc tion.
Prin ci ples of Humani tar ian Response
The in di vid ual right to food is based on the U.N.
Uni ver sal Dec la ra tion of Human Rights (1948),
 additional sup port ing human rights cove nants and
con ven tions, refu gee law, and hu mani tar ian law.
The Ge neva Con ven tions of 1949 and Ad di tional
Pro to cols of 1966 spe cifi cally es tab lish the right of
non com bat ants in in tra- and in ter state con flict
zones not to starve. In ad di tion, is sues of hu mani  -
tar ian ac cess to be lea guered popu la tions caught
with out food in con flict zones have been raised
by the U.N. Gen eral As sem bly in pro pos als for a
New  International Hu mani tar ian Order (1985), by
UNI CEF in the World Sum mit for Chil dren (1990), 
by the In ter na tional Con fer ence on Nu tri tion  World 
Dec la ra tion and Plan of Ac tion (ICN 1992), and by 
vari ous gov ern ment, NGO, and in ter gov ern ment
con sor tia. Le gally, human rights con sti tute a set of
in ter state po liti cal ob li ga tions. But hu mani tar ian
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7 In 1990 the U.N. es tab lished the De part ment of Hu mani tar ian Af fairs (now the U.N. Of fice f or the Co or di na tion of Hu mani tar ian
Af fairs) to co or di nate cri sis as sis tance, but it is un der funded and un der used, with in a de quate staff ing and a lim ited man date that re  -
strict ef fi cient and timely in ter agency re sponse.as sis tance is sup posed to be apo liti cal. Be cause
state- administered aid is al most al ways po liti cal, a
strong pref er ence has emerged for NGO or mul ti  -
lat eral ac tions that can by pass in di vid ual state
 political in ter ests. As a cor ol lary to the in di vidu al’s 
right to food, NGOs in sist on a “right to as sist”
 victims of con flict. Seek ing to main tain a “neu tral”
stance, they ne go ti ate quan ti ties and terms of
food de liv er ies with what ever local, in sur gent,
state, or other authori ties are pres ent on a case- by-
 case basis.
Ne go ti ated ac cess has been achieved through
safe- passage and cross- border op era tions that es -
tab lish zones or cor ri dors of “tran quil lity” for food
aid de liv ery. NGOs offer a va ri ety of op tions for
reach ing vul ner able popu la tions with food aid; do  -
nors in ter ested in reach ing hun gry non com bat ants
se lect one or more or gani za tions from the U.N.
mul ti lat eral in sti tu tions, bi lat eral in sti tu tions, or
NGOs op er at ing in a given zone. How well NGOs
func tion de pends on their abil ity to de liver more aid 
when con di tions make it pos si ble and to cut back
when con di tions are dan ger ous. One dis ad van tage
of such flexi bil ity is that it dis cour ages mul ti lat eral
co op era tion, be cause each NGO is op er at ing on its
own, when soli dar ity and co op era tion are needed to
use shrink ing food aid re sources op ti mally. An other 
is that de liv er ing more food safely often in volves
con ces sions, rang ing from po liti cal rec og ni tion in
the case of south ern Su da nese reb els to pro vi sion of 
ar til lery and ve hi cles to armed in ter me di ar ies who
de liver the food in the cases of Bos nia, Rwanda,
and So ma lia.
Con ces sions, in ad di tion to the food it self,
 arguably strengthen the con flict ing par ties and pro  -
long their war ef forts, while doing noth ing to as sure 
that food safely reaches in tended bene fi ci ar ies
rather than com bat ants. The very neu tral ity of NGOs
makes them po liti cal tools of do nors and  recipients.
They often find them selves in the po si tion of buy  -
ing in tel li gence and se cu rity from the very thugs the 
world com mu nity is seek ing to con trol (An der son
1994). Crit ics con tend that NGOs, while as sum ing
a po liti cal role usu ally re served for gov ern ment
agen cies, are re spon si ble only to their do nors and
may dis tort or pre vent local ac tion and di rect
 involvement in ne go tia tions. NGOs may also face
re sis tance from donor gov ern ments that have their
own po liti cal agenda. Hu mani tar ian in ter ven tion  -
ists such as Médecins Sans Fron tières, who seek to
de liver es sen tial food and medi cal aid with out re  -
gard to po liti cal af filia tion, have faced re sis tance
not only from war ring par ties but some times also
from ex ter nal do nors such as the United States and
France that ob jected to ex ter nal as sis tance in cer tain 
con texts (Jean 1992).
To ration al ize their actions, a group of NGOs
have devised the Provi dence Prin ci ples of Human  -
itarian Action in Armed Con flicts (Box 3) (Minear
and Weiss 1993). Such prom ul ga tions sum ma rize
desires to remain impar tial and neu tral but can not
resolve the basic dilemma: aid never is truly
 apolitical, and uncon ditional food aid does not
change the behav iors of com bat ants, move them
closer to a nego ti ated set tle ment, or improve their
respect for humani tar ian law, human rights, or
human life. As NGOs and relief agen cies respond
to pro tracted com plex emer gen cies, they also are
forced to assume higher lev els of finan cial and
admin is tra tive plan ning that make their actions
politi cal. Offer ing assis tance in politi cal and natu  -
ral dis as ter situa tions over mul ti ple years can turn
aid agen cies into per ma nent pro vid ers of inter na  -
tional wel fare, a role for which they are ill
equipped (Walker 1994). Duf field (1994a, 1996),
who has writ ten on con flict and food inse cu rity in
Eri trea, Ethio pia, Soma lia, and Sudan, insists that
food aid feeds vio lence and has become part of the
prob lem rather than the solu tion. Local par tici pa  -
tion and empow er ment are part of conflict- related
food aid dis tri bu tions, but in war zones the “grass
roots” tend to be vio lent. WFP has insti tuted inter  -
nal codes of con duct to guide part ner ships for aid
deliv ery; it seeks to main tain its “non po li ti cal
status through a pol icy and prac tice of impar ti al ity, 
as opposed to the more pas sive con cept of neu tral  -
ity. Impar ti al ity implies being fully aware of the
politi cal impli ca tions of food inter ven tions, and
seek ing to keep food aid out of the politi cal and
mili tary equa tion” (WFP 1995, 65). WFP expects
com mu ni ties to  assume much of the bur den for
trans form ing relief into devel op ment after a con  -
flict has passed. But find ing indi vidu als or insti tu  -
tions to assume rep re sen ta tive lead er ship remains
dif fi cult (Davies 1994), which is one of the rea sons 
pro po nents of mili tary humani tari an ism argue for
more, not less,  emer gency assis tance deliv ered
through armed forces.
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With the end of the Cold War, use of U.N. mili tary
forces is ex pand ing to fa cili tate larger- scale de liv  -
ery of hu mani tar ian and de vel op ment aid dur ing
and after con flict. Mili tary hu mani tari ans also as sist 
in the dis ar ma ment of former com bat ants and over  -
see the rec on cilia tion, re pa tria tion, and re set tle ment 
pro cess; free elec tions; and the res to ra tion of po liti  -
cal sta bil ity. The United Na tions author ized mili  -
tary in ter ven tion in 1991–92 to re verse Iraqi
 aggression in Ku wait and cre ate safe ha vens for
Iraqi Kurds in need of hu mani tar ian as sis tance; in
1992 to de liver hu mani tar ian aid to starv ing So ma -
lis and to dis arm So mali war lords; in 1993 and fol  -
low ing years to pro tect U.N. agents in Bosnia-
 Herzegovina who were try ing to de liver hu mani tar  -
ian as sis tance to be sieged Mos lems; and in 1994 to
de liver re lief in Rwanda. Mili tary pres ence is mul ti  -
ply ing also in are nas of large- scale former con flicts, 
where sol diers are sup posed to ob serve and keep the 
peace and pre vent con flict from ree merg ing.
Re gional or na tional mili tary forces have also
been called into play at a smaller scale. A force
 organized by the Eco nomic Com mu nity of West
Af ri can States (ECOWAS) en tered Li be ria to cre ate 
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Box 3—Provi dence Prin ci ples of Hu mani tar ian
Ac tion in Armed Con flicts
1.  Re liev ing life- threatening suf fer ing. Hu mani tar ian ac tion should be di rected toward the 
 relief of im me di ate, life- threatening suf fer ing.
2. Pro por tion al ity to need. Hu mani tar ian ac tion should cor re spond to the de gree of suf -
fer ing, wher ever it oc curs. It should affirm the view that life is as pre cious in one part of 
the globe as an other.
3. Non par ti san ship. Hu mani tar ian ac tion should respond to hu man suf fer ing be cause
peo ple are in need, not to ad vance po liti cal, sec tar ian, or other ex tra ne ous agen das. It
should not take sides in con flicts.
4. Independ ence. In order to fulfill their mission, humani tar ian organi za tions should be
free of interfer ence from home or host politi cal authori ties. Humani tar ian space is
essential for effective action.
5. Ac count abil ity. Hu mani tar ian or gani za tions should re port fully on their ac tivi ties to
spon sors and bene fi ci ar ies. Hu mani tari an ism should be trans par ent.
6. Ap pro pri ate ness. Hu mani tar ian ac tion should be tai lored to lo cal cir cum stances and
aim to en hance, not sup plant, lo cally avail able re sources.
7.  Con tex tu ali za tion.  Ef fec tive hu mani tar ian ac tion should en com pass a com pre hen sive
view of over all needs and of the im pact of in ter ven tions. En cour ag ing re spect for
hu man rights and ad dress ing the un der ly ing causes of con flicts are es sen tial ele ments.
8.  Sub sidi ar ity of sov er eignty. Where hu mani tari an ism and sov er eignty clash, sov er  -
eignty should de fer to the re lief of life- threatening suf fer ing.
Source:  Mi near and Weiss 1993.cor ri dors of tran quil lity through which food might
move. In stead of end ing the con flict, how ever,
ECOWAS was drawn into it. Such re gional coa li  -
tions tend to lack the re sources, in fra struc ture, or
po liti cal will to in ter vene ef fec tively and stop the
con flict, as mem ber gov ern ments fear that es tab  -
lish ing a prin ci ple of armed in ter ven tion might be
used against them some time in the fu ture. Na tional
mili tary op era tions also oc ca sion ally have been
 labeled “hu mani tar ian.” In Chia pas, Mexi can army
per son nel were re ported to be de liv er ing food to vil  -
lages ran sacked by Za pa tis tas. In the Gua te ma lan
high lands, local or U.S. mili tary forces were
 reported to have helped dig  latrines or in stall po ta  -
ble water sys tems. Where the mili tary con trib utes to 
such re build ing ef forts, it may dis cour age local
com mu ni ties from self- reliance and in crease de  -
pend ence on ex ter nal agen cies, a dis ad van tage for
longer- term re ha bili ta tion of local po liti cal, demo  -
cratic con trol (Messer 1996a).
Mili tary in ter ven tions at all scales have been
criti cized for their ad hoc or gani za tion, in ef fec tive -
ness, poor co or di na tion, lack of par tici pa tion by
local com mu ni ties in plan ning and im ple men ta tion, 
and fail ure to miti gate con flicts (Messer 1996a).
Par ticu larly in the former Yugo sla via, mili tary
 humanitarianism has been re viled as an ex cuse for
in ac tion that al lowed ag gres sors to con tinue human
rights abuses (Her met 1992). Crit ics al lege that like
ne go ti ated hu mani tar ian ac cess, mili tary hu mani  -
tari an ism ac tu ally in ten si fies armed con flict by pro -
vid ing food, em ploy ment, arms, ve hi cles, and in  -
come for local armed units. Mili tary op era tions
en cour age con tin ued mili ta ri za tion in con flict
zones by or gan iz ing re lief as a mili tary cam paign.
Large- scale and ex pen sive op era tions tend to mar  -
ginal ize smaller- scale re lief ef forts even though
smaller- scale wet- feeding pro grams, as in So ma lia,
are less likely to be van dal ized and more likely to
in volve less- violent local par tici pa tion and lead er  -
ship (Af ri can Rights 1994a). The siz able quan ti ties
of dry foods and arms moved by the mili tary are
fun gi ble and in vite pil fer age.
Human rights ad vo cates ad di tion ally note that
mili tary hu mani tari an ism and ne go ti ated ac cess
dis tort the human rights pic ture. Whereas em pha -
sis should be on the com mu ni ty’s right to sur vive,
the in di vidu al’s right not to starve, and im prov ing
com mu nity and in di vid ual ca paci ties for food
self- reliance and human de vel op ment, aid do nors
have fo cused more on their own rights of ac cess
and have evalu ated suc cess in terms of tons of food 
moved rather than bene fits to re cipi ents (Dan ish
Red Cross 1995).
The Role of Food Aid in Con flict
Food aid, used as a po liti cal tool, often has been
criti cized as an un der ly ing con di tion of con flict. Es -
pe cially dur ing the Cold War, the United States and
other do nors used food aid to re ward and strengthen 
friends and pun ish and de sta bi lize  enemies (Wal ler  -
stein 1979). After the Cold War, in con flict or
 potential con flict set tings such as Rwanda in the
early 1990s, food aid con tin ued to be used as a po -
liti cal tool by which West ern donor gov ern ments
sought to as sist po liti cal lead ers in eco nomic
growth and po liti cal sta bi li za tion pro grams.
Food aid also has been criti cized as a com po  -
nent of asym met ric food flows that lower do mes tic
food prices, dis cour age local pro duc tion, con trib ute 
to rural pov erty and cri sis, and delay live li hood
 recovery once emer gen cies sub side (Lappé and
Col lins 1978). Eco nomic evi dence to sup port this
ar gu ment is lack ing in long- term con flict zones
such as Eri trea, how ever, where local popu la tions
have few other op tions. Lack of draft ani mals,
seeds, tools, and fun gi ble as sets means that food aid 
is the main food source keep ing peo ple alive. Des ti  -
tute farm ers and herd ers can not re store in de pend ent 
live li hoods be cause con flict, not food aid, has left
them im pov er ished.
Food- first crit ics tend to focus on food aid’s
nega tive ef fects on local rural econo mies, but food
aid also has sig nifi cant posi tive na tional and
 regional ef fects. Food aid saves lives of many who
might oth er wise starve in con flict situa tions, par  -
ticu larly where hun ger is being used as a weapon.
Hu mani tar ian food aid cre ates em ploy ment, gives
im pe tus to trans port in fra struc ture, sup ports com  -
mer cial farm ing through local pur chase in non con  -
flict areas, helps the treas ury of the re cipi ent coun  -
try where ex change rates for re lief op era tions are
pegged at ar ti fi cially high of fi cial lev els, and sup  -
ports flows to black mar ket or par al lel food econo  -
mies where in ef fi cient of fi cial mo nopo lies exist
(Duf field and Pren der gast 1994, 134–35).
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used stra te gi cally to sus tain con flict. Dur ing the
Biafran- Nigerian civil war (1967–70), Bia frans
were on the brink of star va tion. Air lifted food al leg  -
edly tar geted to the needi est women and chil dren
in stead sup ported the Bia fran eth nic Ibo (state)
army and bu re acracy, for whom food was oth er wise 
scarce and ex pen sive, and night re lief flights pro -
vided a cover for clan des tine ship ments of arms.
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Dur ing the Ethio pian civil war, emer gency food 
aid meant to feed fam ine vic tims in stead was hi  -
jacked by the Der gue gov ern ment, which used it to
feed their forces and to lure op po si tion groups into
forced re set tle ment pro grams (Clay 1988). Food re  -
lief also sus tained the Eri trean in sur gency, es pe  -
cially in drought years that oth er wise would have
ended in fam ine. The Eri trean Emer gency  Relief
Desk dis trib uted food to ci vil ian sup port ers through 
re spon si ble local lead er ship. In con trast to those in
power re ceiv ing food on both sides of the con flicts
in So ma lia and the Sudan, Eri trean lead er ship ap  -
par ently did not prey on local popu la tions (Duf field
and Pren der gast 1994).
Af ri can Rights (1994a) has criti cized the way
re lief in these and other Af ri can cases was de liv ered 
es sen tially with out ac count abil ity on the part of the
do nors, who were mostly NGOs, or the re cipi ents,
who were mostly par ties to the con flict. Whereas
food aid might have been used as a tool to ne go ti ate
an end to con flicts in Bu rundi, Ethio pia, Li be ria,
and Sudan, in stead it handed mili tants live li hoods,
trans port, and an ad di tional source of con trol over
local popu la tions that en abled them to con tinue the
fight ing. Even in exile, Rwan dan Hutu mili tants
man aged to con trol dis tri bu tion of food aid, a
source of sus te nance and power over oth ers that
kept their lead er ship and in va sion hopes alive.
Moreo ver, al though food aid pre vents star va  -
tion, it rarely con trib utes ef fec tively to food or
 nutritional se cu rity for ci vil ian popu la tions. Even
where ra tions reach the most nu tri tion ally vul ner  -
able—women of re pro duc tive age, chil dren, and the 
eld erly—their im pact is lim ited be cause the usual
al lot ments of grain, sugar, and oil are in ade quate.
Women and chil dren need ad di tional mi cro nu tri  -
ents that are usu ally not part of the pack age. Diets
there fore must be sup ple mented by home food pro  -
duc tion, for ag ing, or mar keted foods.
In cer tain cases, such as Bos nia, food aid has
 allowed large popu la tions to main tain rela tive food
se cu rity in the midst of cri sis. In oth ers, such as
 Sudanese refu gee areas in Uganda in the early
1980s, house holds were able to grow enough food
to sell vege ta bles, seeds, and root crops and by spe  -
cial iz ing, rec re ate econo mies where tools, clothes,
and serv ices were read ily avail able and traded.
Where refu gees en gage in food pro duc tion and
mar ket ing, they also en hance the sup ply of food-
 based sources of mi cro nu tri ents or di nar ily miss ing
in food aid ra tions.
In most emer gency feed ing situa tions, how  -
ever, popu la tions de pend ent on food aid find it dif -
fi cult to com bine re ceipt of as sis tance with live li  -
hood ac tivi ties be cause they are hemmed in by
con flict. Or they are refu gees in coun tries where
laws deny them ac cess to land or em ploy ment and
where host gov ern ments try to iso late them from
local popu la tions to try to avoid in tro duc ing ad di  -
tional po liti cal and eco nomic stress and dis ease
into an al ready frag mented or frag ile so cial and
 environmental fab ric. Where ex ter nal agen cies
have launched mas sive re lief op era tions, as in
 Malawi for Mo zam bi can refu gees and in Thai land
for Cam bo dian refu gees, they often try to ad dress
live li hood and health needs of al ready set tled
popu la tions as a hu mani tar ian and prac ti cal ges  -
ture. Aid oth er wise might raise local per cep tions of 
un fair ness, rela tive dep ri va tion, and con flict
 potential. Long- term food aid en ter prises, such
as the IFRC’s in Ma lawi, raise an ad di tional
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8 Both as pects al lowed the Bia fran se ces sion ists to fight on. With out mas sive ex ter nal food  aid, in clud ing sig nifi cant church-
 affiliated as sis tance that helped Bia frans pro duce more of their own food, Bia fra’s war of at  tri tion would have been less pro tracted
be cause Ojukwu, the Bia fran com mander, would have been un able to keep po liti cally sig nifi ca nt ele ments of Bia fran so ci ety well
fed and loyal (Strem lau 1977, 246–252). Ar gua bly, pro long ing the war helped bring about a less  vio lent and re talia tory peace, how  -
ever. In April 1969, the Ni ge rian leader Gowon re vamped his mili tary com mand. He re placed Col o nel Ben ja min Adekunle, who had
out spo ken an tipa thy for Ibos, with Colo nel Oluse gun Obasanjo, a mili tary en gi neer whose fa ir ness was re spected. Obasanjo is cred  -
ited with win ning the war not only by mili tary strat egy but also by his repu ta tion for fair tr eat ment. This re moved an ele ment of con  -
tinu ing Ibo re sis tance, namely, fear of vio lent and venge ful re pri sals (Strem lau 1977, 331– 32).di lemma: what hap pens once the refu gees leave,
and the aid on which the econ omy has grown de  -
pend ent with draws? Pro longed food aid dis torts
area econo mies, and re gions ac cus tomed to cob  -
bling to gether food se cu rity in part from food aid
face an un cer tain fu ture in an era of de creas ing  food 
aid ton nage and in creas ing emer gency de mands.
These con cerns high light once again the un sus tain  -
abil ity of food aid, which can not pro vide long- term
food se cu rity, and the re gional con texts of con flict.
In post con flict situa tions, ex ter nal food ra tions
are sup posed to pro vide tem po rary re lief while
local peo ple re or gan ize and re store live li hood se cu  -
rity. Un for tu nately, in many con tem po rary post con -
flict situa tions aid is de liv ered with out a plan for
the aid giver to leave. After years of war, local and
state gov ern ments lack re sources and skills for dis  -
as ter pre par ed ness, ef fec tive re sponse, or peace time 
 development.
Post con flict Response
Popu la tions seek ing food and live li hood se cu rity in
post war situa tions face many ma te rial and so cial
ob sta cles. In rural areas, they must re move land
mines; re store soil and water man age ment in fra  -
struc ture; lo cate tools, seeds, live stock, and fuel;
and se cure in vest ment capi tal for fu ture live li hood
and food se cu rity. In town and coun try side, they
must form or renew com mu ni ties; re build so cial
 infrastructure, es pe cially labor or gani za tion; and
se cure co op era tion among dis pa rate po liti cal and
eth nic ele ments with vary ing war time ex pe ri ences,
so that local peo ple—male and fe male, young and
old—can work ef fec tively with each other to ward
peace time de vel op ment (see, for ex am ple, Rich ards 
and Ruivenk amp 1997). When states are weak, as in 
many post- civil war set tings, NGOs try to in volve
local com mu ni ties in de sign ing and im ple ment ing
water, ag ri cul ture, and en vi ron mental pro tec tion
proj ects. These ac tivi ties have the added aim of
press ing for merly or po ten tially feud ing fac tions
into co op era tion. Ef fec tive plan ning for re con struc  -
tion re quires re gional and local so cial, en vi ron -
mental, tech ni cal, and po liti cal as sess ments, and a
clear time frame and pri ori ties for pro grams and
follow- up evalua tions.
Chart ing the Politi cal Ecol ogy
A so cial sur vey of sig nifi cant po liti cal and cul tural
di men sions of human popu la tions within spe cific
re gions is the first step. Popu la tions can be clas  -
sified as refu gees, forci bly set tled, self- settled, or
long- term resi dents and char ac ter ized by re lig ion
and eth nic ity. Re gions can be sub di vided into
political- ecological zones, which have sig nifi cant
geo graphic and so cio poli ti cal di men sions.
Political- ecological as sess ments should note which
popu la tions are at par ticu lar risk for live li hood fail  -
ure, such as pas tor al ists whose mo bil ity might be
re duced by new ag ri cul tural or pri vate prop erty
bounda ries, ag ri cul tur al ists whose ac cess to land or
water might be di min ished by de mands of tour ism
or in dus try, or trad ers whose com merce might be
cur tailed by new regu la tions. So cio poli ti cal char ac  -
teri za tions of popu la tions within a re gion in clude
each peo ple’s past, cur rent, and po ten tial roles in
local, na tional, and re gional po liti cal econo mies;
their cur rent or po ten tial re la tion ships with a cen tral 
po liti cal author ity and ex ter nal aid or gani za tions;
and re la tion ships be tween groups that por tend
 cooperative or con flict po ten tial. Ad di tional char  -
ac ter is tics use ful for situ at ing local popu la tions
within a re gional econ omy are their live li hood pat  -
terns and cus tom ary or pos si ble ac cess to land,
water, mar kets, and trade routes.
In sti tu tional char ac teri za tions are the sec ond
step. Water may be a first pri or ity for rural popu la  -
tions, fol lowed by tools, seeds, and ani mals for food 
pro duc tion. Ex ter nal fun ders in ter ested in help ing
re store food se cu rity must com mu ni cate with local
com mu nity voices be fore set ting their own or
 accepting the gov ern ment’s agenda, but after years
of war, local so cie ties may have to re or gan ize be -
fore they can offer guid ance on pri or ity needs and
local mecha nisms or self- help groups for meet ing
them (Davies 1994). Iden ti fy ing rep re sen ta tive and
ac count able com mu nity lead er ship and or gani za  -
tions may be the most deli cate step, and the most
im por tant for fu ture con flict avoid ance.
After pri ori ties for ac tion have been de ter mined 
and local in sti tu tions iden ti fied as part ners, pri or ity
needs and part ner ships must be matched with gov  -
ern men tal or non gov ern men tal agen cies that can
 assist with fund ing, tech ni cal re sources, and tran si  -
tional sup port, in clud ing food se cu rity. Few coun  -
32tries emerg ing from dec ades of war will
achieve food self- reliance quickly, so mul ti year
food aid is part of the pic ture, re quir ing care ful
plan ning, fund ing, and lo gis tics. Stra te gic dis tri bu  -
tion of aid, a third step in chart ing po liti cal ecol ogy,
can make the dif fer ence be tween co op era tion or
com pe ti tion and con flict.
Con sid ered to gether, these steps to re con struc  -
tion focus on iden ti fy ing, using, and en hanc ing local
live li hood ca paci ties in ways that can re duce con  -
flict po ten tial. The em pha sis on political- ecological
 assessment con trasts with con ven tional needs- based
as sess ment in which do nors look at the way money is 
spent to ad dress vul ner abili ties but not at the ef fects
of aid on local peo ple and in sti tu tions. Agen cies
 engaged in link ing con flict re duc tion with relief-
 and- development have rec om mended that re lief
meas ures ad dress sus tain able live li hood along with
de liv ery of basic serv ices by in volv ing local peo ple
in ways that build on their ca paci ties. Evalua tions
would be based on en hanced local ca paci ties, not just 
nu tri ents de liv ered (Dan ish Red Cross 1995).
Re con struc tive ca paci ties are more eas ily iden ti  -
fied, how ever, where in tact com mu ni ties exist. They
are harder to lo cate after pro longed con flicts that have 
de stroyed local popu la tions, in fra struc ture, and in sti  -
tu tions. In civil wars in Af rica, par ties to con flict have 
de lib er ately chased out com mu nity resi dents and re  -
moved youth from their tra di tional in sti tu tional an  -
chors. Most able- bodied youth who might have pro  -
vided the nu cleus for re con struc tion have lit tle
prac ti cal peace time ex pe ri ence and need school ing
and em ploy ment skills. De mo bi liz ing, train ing, and
in te grat ing these masses into a pro duc tive econ omy is 
per haps the great est chal lenge for coun tries emerg ing
from gen era tions of war, as well as for gov ern ments
or do nors seek ing to as sist them. An other chal lenge is 
re in te grat ing refu gees who fled the con flict and might 
now wish to re turn. Avoid ing se lec tive de vel op ment
that fa vors some eth nic, re lig ious, or geo graphic
groups over oth ers and thus sows the seeds of fu ture
re sent ment and con flict is a third chal lenge, par ticu  -
larly for lead ers who wish to re ward their sup port ers.
All are chal lenges fac ing Eri trea dur ing its post con  -
flict re con struc tion, as docu mented in Box 4.
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Les sons in Post war Recon struc tion
Cur rent post war re con struc tion ef forts chart new
ter ri tory, for there are no prior les sons about what
kinds of re con struc tion might work best in the
post–Cold War era. The les sons of post–World War 
II Europe and Asia are dis tant and dif fer ent. The
 regions af fected in these con flicts began with more
highly de vel oped in fra struc ture, more highly edu  -
cated popu la tions, and su pe rior ag ri cul tural tech no  -
logi cal re sources for re build ing na tional econo mies
and food sys tems. They also left their so cie ties,
how ever de mor al ized, in tact.
Pos si ble ex am ples of in sti tu tions and pro grams
for re build ing post war food sys tems might be
gleaned from post in de pend ence ex pe ri ences fol  -
low ing wars of in de pend ence in Af rica and Asia.
But in con trast to the wars of in de pend ence, where
post independence po liti cal lead er ship as sumed
gov ern ance, and all felt a bond be cause they had
strug gled for a com mon cause, to re move the co lo  -
nial op pres sors, in the mod ern wars, in most cases,
no clear  political lead er ship emerges to lead popu  -
la tions into na tion hood. This was also the case in
Paki stan and Bang la desh, where there were major
lead er ship strug gles fol low ing their wars of in de  -
pend ence.
His tory sug gests that food se cu rity can be
achieved where mas sive and well- positioned aid
com pletely re builds a to tally de stroyed in fra struc -
ture or re fur bishes an in tact one. Mas sive in fu sions
of U.S. aid al lowed Ko rean ag ri cul ture to be re built
where the tra di tional in fra struc ture had been to tally
de stroyed. In post–World War II West ern Europe,
where ag ri cul tural in fra struc ture re mained in tact,
coun tries re sumed pro duc tion once they re ceived
mas sive but tem po rary in fu sions of eco nomic and
food aid. More often in later twentieth- century civil
wars, how ever, the de struc tion leaves coun tries
some where in be tween. In fra struc ture is se verely
dam aged, but still- entrenched in ter ests ren der it
 impossible to make a fresh start. Tra di tional ways
may no longer be ap pro pri ate, but in di vidu als can  -
not mod ern ize be cause they are al ready fully oc cu  -
pied try ing to cope in the old un der pro duc tive ways. 
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9 This sec tion was pre pared from re search ma te ri als and in ter pre ta tions as sem bled by Ze r ai Fesshaie, Mi zane Yo han nes, and Tho mas 
Mar chione.34
Box 4—Re con struct ing food and nu tri tional se cu rity in post war Eri trea
In 1991, af ter 30 years of civil war with Ethio pia, Eri trea
gained its in de pend ence. Seven years later, the coun try is
still strug gling to re store food se cu rity in the wake of dec  -
ades of con flict.
The precolo nial his tory of Eri trea was char ac ter ized
by in ter tribal feud ing over ter ri to ries and wars be tween Is  -
lamic Egyp tian popu la tions to the north west and the
Chris tian Abys sin ian king dom to the south. In the late
nine teenth cen tury, the fall of the Abys sin ian king dom left 
a po liti cal vac uum soon filled by It aly, which took over
Eri trea as a col ony.
From 1889 through 1941 Eri trea’s so ci ety and econ  -
omy were trans formed by Ital ian oc cu pa tion. The Ital ians
con fis cated “un oc cu pied” lands, con structed wa ter works,
and ini ti ated plan ta tion schemes. They en cour aged small
in dus tries, trade, and serv ice oc cu pa tions in towns and cit  -
ies and es tab lished a mili tary bu reauc racy. These al ter na  -
tives to sub sis tence ag ri cul ture and pas tor al ism re duced
Eri trean food self- sufficiency and in creased de pend ence
on im ported food, a de pend ence that has per sisted.
With the de feat of It aly in World War II, the United
King dom as sumed he gem ony over Eri trea and neigh bor  -
ing Ethio pia. In 1952 a U.N. plan granted in de pend ence to 
an Ethio pian fed era tion, with Eri trea as a rela tively
autono mous unit. Ethio pia’s back ward eco nomic state,
lack of in vest ment in Eri trea, and re pres sive poli cies set
the stage for Eri trea’s strug gle for in de pend ence. At the
same time, Eri trean po liti cal fac tions car ried out their own 
in ter nal strug gles for power, which had roots in precolo  -
nial in ter tribal con flicts. The in ter nal civil war, com bined
with the war with Ethio pia, left ag ri cul tural and agro pas  -
toral lands in dis ar ray and the in habi tants des ti tute, with  -
out long- term re sources.
The food situa tion in Eri trea has been char ac ter ized
by grain defi cits since co lo nial times. The sub sis tence
 sector was ne glected first by the Ital ians, then the Brit ish,
and fi nally the fed eral Ethio pian authori ties. Be gin ning in
1961, as fight ing closed down the re main ing plan ta tions
and trans formed ag ri cul tural lands into bat tle fields, the
food se cu rity situa tion de te rio rated. Es ca lat ing con flict
be tween the Eri trean Lib era tion Front (ELF) and the Eri  -
trean Peo ple’s Lib era tion Front (EPLF), plus suc ces sive
droughts from 1978 on ward, wors ened food defi cits.
Eri trean lead ers ex ploited sources of food made
avail able through hu mani tar ian re lief, so mount ing deaths
from fam ine dur ing the Ethio pian droughts of the 1980s
were not evi dent in Eri trea. In 1975, the Eri trean Re lief
As so cia tion (ERA), an af fili ate of the EPLF, was founded
to as sist the grow ing number of refu gees and in ter nally
dis placed peo ple. Be tween 1981 and 1991 it chan neled an
es ti mated 750,000 met ric tons of food to insurgent- held
re gions of Eri trea and Ti gray (Duf field and Pren der gast
1994, 133). But the so cial col lapse caused by the con flict
and the flight abroad of skilled and un skilled la bor, plus
the de struc tion of physi cal in fra struc ture, now make res to r  -
a tion  of food se cu rity prob lem atic.
Skilled work ers such as me chan ics, ma sons, and
school teach ers who fled the war have not yet re turned.
Over all il lit er acy is es ti mated at 85 per cent, with fe male
il lit er acy twice that of males, and most ru ral ar eas are
with out schools. The war is es ti mated to have pro duced
90,000 or phans, 56,000 dis abled peo ple, 500,000 refu  -
gees, and 100,000 dis placed per sons. Close to one- fourth
of the po ten tial popu la tion is es ti mated to be liv ing
abroad, with some half mil lion in Su dan and the rest
 dispersed across the Mid dle East, Europe, and North
Amer ica. Re mit tances from abroad were es ti mated to be
US$2 mil lion in 1992.
Agri cul ture and indus try must be renewed. Recov ery 
must reverse years of neglect of soils and water works,
replace worn agri cul tural and indus trial equip ment, clear
land mines, replen ish live stock, and rebuild dwell ings.
New sub sis tence pat terns will have to be impro vised
where herd ing and mar ket pat terns shifted in response to
con flict. Cash (export) crops and mar kets will have to be
recon fig ured to com pete in a 21
st  cen tury econ omy. Food
and export crops need water, now in scarce sup ply, and the 
rural peo ple need fuel.
For mer sol diers, re turn ing refu gees, and in tact popu  -
la tions all seek to re ha bili tate their live li hoods. They need
new mar ket op por tu ni ties and sources of pub lic and pri  -
vate in vest ment, as well as live stock, tools, and lo cally
adapted seed va rie ties.
Con flict is a con tinu ing dan ger be cause of the leg acy
of Eri trea’s own pro tracted civil war. Cross- border skir  -
mishes with ELF refu gees liv ing in Su dan have been
blamed on the med dling of out sid ers but may be a symp  -
tom of fes ter ing eth nic con flicts. Con flicts could oc cur in
pastoral- agropastoral low land prov inces over ac cess to
natu ral re sources or in the high lands, where un re solved
eth nic ten sions per sist (Cliffe 1994). In 1998, ten sions
flared with Ethio pia over a bound ary dis pute.
Steps in Eri trean Recon struc tion . From a devel op ment
plan ner’s per spec tive, the first step in recon struc tion
should be a political- ecological assess ment of the
strengths and vul ner abili ties of dif fer ent regions and
locali ties. In Eri trea, how ever, political- ecological assess  -
ment was not the first step taken. After inde pend ence, it
embarked on land reform, train ing, and mac roeconomic
pol icy ini tia tives with out reli able data and extended rather 
than demo bi lized the ranks of the vol un teer army (Cliffe
1994). The gov ern ment did not estab lish that the coun try
had the human resources needed to imple ment the planned 
proj ects before it began to recon struct its infra struc ture.
Nor did it dem on strate envi ron mental sen si tiv ity.35
A nag ging ques tion is whether the Eri trean tran si tion
gov ern ment, which came to power af ter pro tracted strug  -
gle, will be able to re ori ent its goals from revo lu tion to  -
ward peace, whether it will be able to at tract and so lid ify a
fol low ing, or whether it will be come the tar get of re newed 
guer rilla move ments against it. Peace time food needs,
health de mands, and em ploy ment re quire ments are very
dif fer ent from those of a war time econ omy. Lead ers dare
not ig nore eth nic, oc cu pa tional, re lig ious, and geo graphic
di vi sions, which hold the seeds of fu ture con flict.
Do nors can take sev eral roles in the re con struc tion
pro cess. One role could be to help fi nance de vel op ment
proj ects in ar eas with high con flict po ten tial that may be of 
low pri or ity to the gov ern ment. An other role could be to
work more closely with lo cal in sti tu tions and peo ple in
set ting pri ori ties and im ple ment ing pro grams and proj -
ects. A com mon sug ges tion for stretch ing food aid and
 agricultural in vest ment capi tal is to make pri ori ties more
com mu nity based, es pe cially where a strong cen tral state
is lack ing. But first re li able and rep re sen ta tive com mu nity 
in sti tu tions are needed (Davies 1994; Max well and Li -
rensu 1994).
Aid giv ers also need to be sen si tive to po ten tial
sources of dis sen sion within and be tween groups. War-
 torn ar eas in Eri trea are re source poor and high in popu la -
tion den sity, es pe cially once refu gees re turn. Com pe ti tion
for re sources and in flu ence is likely to be ex tremely high.
To put the ru ral econ omy and food se cu rity on a firm
foun da tion, do nors should help en sure that the coun try has 
mecha nisms to pro cess land and other claims, re build
mar kets and com mu ni ca tions, and sup ply capi tal for ag ri  -
cul tural in ten si fi ca tion and in dus trial de vel op ment.
Fund ing Re ha bili ta tion .  Some po ten tial sources of in  -
vest ment capi tal are lo cal in come from live stock, cash
crops, or for eign re mit tances, but these are likely to be in  -
suf fi cient. Live stock and cash crops re quire ini tial in vest  -
ment and lead time be fore they can ac cu mu late capi tal for
in vest ment, and earn ings from abroad are dis rupted when
peo ple re turn. Refu gees liv ing abroad are an other po ten  -
tial source of hu man and in vest ment capi tal. Refu gees so
far have been tapped for their re mit tances, but not for their 
ex per tise or po ten tial di rect in vest ment in the re con struc  -
tion pro cess. The in ter na tional de vel op ment banks, es pe  -
cially the World Bank, proba bly should be cul ti vated as
the most im por tant po ten tial source of capi tal in vest ment,
but it is un clear at what scale and with what lo cal part ners.
Gov ern ments still ap pear to be the most likely part  -
ners for large- scale mar ket, com mu ni ca tions, and in fra  -
struc ture proj ects as well as for mac roeconomic plan ning.
But de vel op ment loans and spend ing must be struc tured
so that they pro mote co op era tion, not com pe ti tion and
con flict. One sug ges tion is to fund only joint proj ects, in
which for merly hos tile neigh bor ing par ties must co op er  -
ate to get re sources (An der son 1994). Pro grams could be
de signed from the top down in view of the political-
 ecological back ground or from the bot tom up by com mu  -
ni ties that had de cided to pool re sources. An other sug ges  -
tion is to give pri or ity to proj ects that ad dress both food
se cu rity and in come gen era tion con cerns. Where mar kets
are un cer tain, com mu ni ties are likely to make food a pri  -
or ity ahead of other reve nue schemes and de mand tech ni  -
cal serv ices re lated to food pro duc tion. Re con struc tion
banks and in ter na tional agen cies must be will ing to evalu  -
ate and re spond to such re quests, which in the past have
been met mostly by NGOs, and  lo cal peo ple, es pe cially
women, need to par tici pate more in the de sign of proj ects.
NGO- assisted sus tain able live li hood proj ects also
will re quire in fu sions of ex ter nal capi tal. In Eri trea close
to 20 lo cal or for eign NGOs are, for ex am ple, pro vid ing
credit and train ing to de mo bi lized army mem bers and in  -
ter nally dis placed peo ple, fa cili tat ing the re turn of refu  -
gees from Su dan and re ha bili tat ing ir ri ga tion schemes. So
far the scale of these op era tions is small, but they are ex  -
pected to ex pand.
Food Aid in Recon struc tion . The major ity of Eri tre ans
remain depend ent on food aid because domes tic food pro  -
duc tion can not meet the need, and income to import com  -
mer cial food is lack ing. Even in the good rain fall year
of 1992, local grain pro duc tion amounted to only about
60 per cent of esti mated con sump tion needs. In the poor
rain fall year of 1993 that fol lowed, it dropped to 30 per  -
cent. Food- for- work schemes are unlikely to be as use ful
as out right relief because of inade quate infra struc ture.
In sum mary, Eri trea’s post war re con struc tion of food 
se cu rity calls for the fol low ing ac tions:
l a political- ecological as sess ment of hu man and
physi cal re sources (es pe cially wa ter);
l a plan for refu gee re pa tria tion that can re turn refu  -
gees to ar eas of po ten tial pro duc tion ac tively in  -
volv ing them in plan ning this re turn pro cess;
l a stra te gic wa ter plan that can as sure ad di tional sup  -
plies for ag ri cul ture as well as ade quate and safe
 potable wa ter for ur ban and ru ral ar eas (this must be 
pre limi nary to any export- cropping scheme);
l ad di tional sources of in vest ment capi tal, es pe  -
cially for live stock, and credit to help re es tab lish
farm ing in the short term; and
l a mul ti year food aid plan that will reach the most
vul ner able mem bers of the popu la tion and use
food stra te gi cally to encour age reha bili ta tion of
poten tially pro duc tive zones. The dura tion and
extent of food aid will depend in part on how
effec tively com mu ni ties, gov ern ment, and exter  -
nal donors are able to imple ment pro duc tion
strate gies that can reduce the need for food aid,
while pur su ing agro pas toral, indus trial, and serv  -
ice indus try schemes that can gen er ate income to
pur chase food.In ad di tion, vio lence has be come a way of life in
part sup ported by mis di rected hu mani tar ian aid.
To pro ceed from re lief to de vel op ment, do nors
will have to con sider much more se ri ously the poli  -
tics of local con trol in weak- state situa tions. They
will need to be es pe cially vigi lant to keep food aid
from being ma nipu lated as a weapon and ref use to
sup port local po liti cal lead ers who prey on in tended 
food- aid re cipi ents. In Duf field’s terms, both gov  -
ern ment and NGO giv ers of aid have a re spon si bil  -
ity to thwart the “ra tion al ity” of vio lence at all so  -
cial lev els (Duf field 1996). At the local so cial and
eco logi cal lev els, they must help in tro duce strate  -
gies of food and live li hood pro duc tion that take into 
ac count so cial re la tions of pro duc tion in ad di tion to
ap pro pri ate seeds, tools, and physi cal in fra struc ture
(Rich ards and Ruivenk amp 1997). At the macro  -
economic level, an other les son is that do nors must
pro mote eco nomic poli cies that sus tain peace. In
her sur vey of struc tural ad just ment in de vel op ing
coun tries, in clud ing war zones, Stewart (1993)
 argues per sua sively that de mands for struc tural
 adjustment in cer tain cases pushed al ready tot ter ing 
gov ern ments over the brink to in sta bil ity. She urges 
that po liti cal as well as eco nomic di men sions of
 stability guide in ter na tional eco nomic pol icy and
lend ing. An eye to ward peace must also be part of
mac roeconomic pol icy in post con flict situa tions.
Boyce (1996) and col leagues, in their ex plo ra tion of 
eco nomic pol icy after El Sal va dor’s civil war, argue 
that un less the peace pro cess re shapes eco nomic
pol icy that ex isted be fore war in coun tries such as
El Sal va dor, both peace and eco nomic per form ance
are bound to fal ter. Mac roeconomic poli cies need to 
be tied to the pledges of peace agree ments, such as
fairer re dis tri bu tion of land to former com bat ants.
They need to make sure growth is not again dis  -
torted or di verted dis pro por tion ately to ward the
upper classes and away from the have- nots, the
origi nal in sur gents. These econo mists argue that aid 
can and should work to ward greater in come equal  -
ity, with out which there will be lit tle chance of eco  -
nomic growth, much less of peace. Yet in the case
of El Sal va dor, the new gov ern ment is not mak ing
the land trans fers that were part of the peace set tle  -
ment. The po liti cal lead ers are not lack ing in capi tal 
but in po liti cal will. The in ter na tional fi nan cial
com mu nity is in a po si tion to exert lev er age.
364. Recommendations and Conclusions
More posi tive sce nar ios for food, ag ri cul ture, and
the en vi ron ment in 2020 are pos si ble if peace can
be pro tected where con flict is im mi nent, achieved
where con flict is ac tive, and sus tained where con  -
flict has ceased. The data as sem bled in this paper
have pre sented sev eral ways to trace the re la tion  -
ships be tween re source scar ci ties, hun ger, and
 conflict. His tori cal, political- economic, food and
ag ri cul ture, and nu tri tional data offer les sons on
un der ly ing and trig ger causes of con flict in dif  -
ferent cases.
Conflict Prevention
Con flict pre ven tion will be cru cial for food se cu rity
and en vi ron mental pro tec tion through 2020. War is
ex pen sive, and the eco nomic sav ings en gen dered
through con flict avoid ance need to be made part of
the cal cu la tion of “re turns” to ag ri cul tural, food aid, 
and eco nomic de vel op ment as sis tance.
• In ter na tional (in ter gov ern men tal) agen cies
and NGO coa li tions, in part ner ship with gov  -
ern ments and com mu ni ties, should or gan ize
con flict early- warning sys tems that in cor po  -
rate political- economic and so cio cul tural fac  -
tors that also un der lie food cri ses.
• De vel op ment as sis tance should in cor po rate
con flict pre ven tion into poli cies, pro grams,
and proj ect plan ning, im ple men ta tion, and
evalua tion.
• Zones of high con flict po ten tial should re  -
ceive high pri or ity for peace- sensitive so cial
and eco nomic as sis tance.
• As a cor ol lary, re sources should be di rected
to those ar eas iden ti fied as conflict- prone
even though this de mands new cal cu la tions
or think ing about “re turns” to in vest ments.
• Aid should be de liv ered in ways that fos ter or
de mand co op era tion among com mu ni ties or
their com po nent groups and that avoid nega  -
tive com pe ti tion lead ing to con flict.
• Where pos si ble, pro grams should be struc  -
tured so that they cre ate open ings for ac tive
par tici pa tion by women and men from af  -
fected zones to par tici pate in re port ing, sur  -
veil lance, and proj ect plan ning, im ple men ta  -
tion, and evalua tion.
Re search in the fol low ing areas can help
achieve these ob jec tives:
• ad di tional analy ses of case stud ies that pin  -
point trig ger and un der ly ing causes in coun  -
tries where con flict erupted;
• ad di tional analy ses of case stud ies of re  -
source poor but peace ful ar eas where con flict
did not erupt to un der stand the so cial, cul  -
tural, po liti cal, and eco nomic dy nam ics that
fos tered peace ful change; and
• con struc tion and evalua tion of pos si ble
check lists for use as early- warning in di ca tors
of food in se cu rity re lated to con flict.
Active Conflict Situations
•Emer gency aid should in cor po rate con flict
miti ga tion as an ob jec tive of emer gency food
dis tri bu tions and as a meas ure of proj ect
evalua tion.
• Emer gency aid should be de liv ered in ways
that de mand ac count abil ity of those de liv er  -
ing as sis tance in ac tive com bat situa tions.
• Where pos si ble, pro grams should be struc  -
tured so that non com bat ant women and men
in combat- affected zones can par tici pate in
sur veil lance, dis tri bu tion, re port ing, and
evalua tion.
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should focus on cre at ing ty polo gies of con flict in
re la tion to scar city and hun ger that
• trace in ten tional and in di rect de struc tive ef  -
fects of con flict,
• chart im pli ca tions for re con struc tion at re  -
gional, lo cal, and coun try lev els, and
• in clude land, wa ter, and bio logi cal en vi ron  -
mental re sources, physi cal and so cial in fra  -
struc ture, and peo ple (com mu ni ties) and their 
safety- net in sti tu tions.
Postconflict Situations
•From coun try to in ter na tional lev els, macro  -
economic plan ning and in ter na tional fi nan  -
cial and struc tural as sis tance should in cor po  -
rate “peace” con sid era tions and con di tions,
tak ing into ac count the ways in which gov  -
ern ment poli cies are likely to in flu ence food
se cu rity, eq ui ta ble out comes, and pov erty
 alleviation.
• At lo cal, sub na tional, and coun try lev els,
 efforts should be made to work closely with
emerg ing com mu ni ties, es pe cially in iden ti fi  -
ca tion of ap pro pri ate seeds, tools, and la bor
or gani za tion for ef fec tive re ha bili ta tion of
ag ri cul tural pro duc tion.
To help achieve these ob jec tives, the fol low ing
re search agenda should be pur sued: At the coun try
level, ty polo gies of emerg ing com mu nity and
grass roots as so cia tions with which de vel op ment
plan ners might de vise and moni tor con flict pre ven  -
tion, con flict reso lu tion, and re con struc tion strate  -
gies should be de vel oped. At coun try and re gional
lev els, re search ers should in ves ti gate ac tivi ties for
fur thering “food from peace” that might be in cor po  -
rated into ag ri cul tural and eco nomic plan ning. And
they should study ag ri cul tural and eco nomic plan  -
ning op tions that in cor po rate sus tain able man age  -
ment of plant ge netic re sources to build more sus -
tain able live li hoods and in crease food se cu rity for
conflict- prone popu la tions.
Conclusions
The analy sis pre sented here, al beit based on crude
data, dem on strates the close re la tion ship be tween
con flict and ag ri cul tural un der pro duc tion in Sub-
 Saharan Af rica. The re view of the lit era ture sug gests
that con sid er able food in se cu rity may be linked to
con flict also in af flicted zones of Asia and Latin
Amer ica. Taken to gether, they sug gest that elimi nat  -
ing the dev as tat ing con se quences of food wars
would pro duce more op ti mis tic world food and hun  -
ger out looks. They em pha size the need to think
“con flict pre ven tion” in food se cu rity and eco nomic
de vel op ment ef forts and the need to link food se cu  -
rity and eco nomic de vel op ment to post con flict re lief.
Ac com plish ing these ties will de mand some
changes and cross- overs in food cri sis and ag ri cul -
tural de vel op ment ac tivi ties. Every di men sion of
food se cu rity and de vel op ment plan ning could and
should in clude ex er cises that ex plore ways to avoid
con flict, re spond to con flict should it occur, and to
re build after con flict has dam aged natu ral and
human re sources. Re build ing local ca paci ties for
food and live li hood pro duc tion al ready is a pri or ity
in many post war re con struc tion ef forts. But good
in ten tions need to be tied more care fully to longer-
 term sce nar ios for sus tain able live li hood se cu rity.
“Re lief to de vel op ment” will be come a re al ity more 
than a catch word only when re lief pro grams have
avail able ad di tional ag ri cul tural ex per tise that can
help guide them in ef forts at ef fi cient water man  -
age ment, bio di verse se lec tion of seeds, ap pro pri ate
par tici pa tion by com mu nity mem bers, and other
fac tors nec es sary to build sus tain able so cial and
 agricultural sys tems.
In the past, “food cri sis re sponse,” “re lief to
 development,” “ag ri cul tural pro duc tion,” and “sus -
tain able de vel op ment” have held sepa rate port  -
folios, as if meet ing sepa rate chal lenges. The close
con nec tions be tween con flict and un der pro duc tion,
how ever, in di cate that to reach food se cu rity and
 optimal ag ri cul tural pro duc tion, with en vi ron mental 
pro tec tion in 2020, con flict pre ven tion and post war
re con struc tion must be come far more  important fac  -
tors in ag ri cul tural plan ning for the 1990s.
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